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Self-Regulation, Normative Choice, and
the Structure of Corporate
Fiduciary Law

William W. Bratton*

Introduction
The American Law Institute (ALI) chose an awkward time to formulate the code of corporate fiduciary duties in Part V of its Principles of Corporate Governance (Principles).1 Confidence in fiduciary law
diminished while this body of rules and standards went through a
long process of drafting and approval. Its drafters had the difficult
assignment of formulating "principles" for fiduciary law's future development-rather than merely "restating" past rulings-at a time
when no consensus existed in the legal community as to why corporate law imposes fiduciary duties or what the operative "principles"
2
of corporate fiduciary law ought to be.
This open conceptual background left the drafters considerable
room to choose the code's contents, even as it complicated the job
*

Professor of Law, Rutgers University School of Law-Newark.

1.

AMERICAN LAw INST.,

PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE:

ANALYSIS

AND

RECOMMENDATIONS (Proposed Final Draft 1992) [hereinafter Proposed Final Draft].
This Article focuses on the basic outline of fiduciary rules set out in Part V. It does not
take up the specialized applications of fiduciary rules in the Pinciples' sections on merg-

ers and takeovers.
2. While the Principles went through a series of tentative drafts during the 1980s,
academics and policymakers moved away from the view that corporations should be subject to more stringent fiduciary regulation and considered instead the deregulatory implications of a microeconomic vision of the corporation. Later, as the Pinciples moved
toward final form, the academics turned away from that deregulatory microeconomic
story to consider new modes of corporate self-regulation in microeconomic terms. See
infra Part II.A.
April 1993
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of articulating a set of best "principles." If the drafters' decisionmaking process were set out for inspection, we would learn much
about the "principles" that inform today's corporate law. But, unfortunately, the drafters do not describe their work in terms of
choices between and among competing principles. Their extensive
commentaries are in a bald, doctrinal style that invests results with
the appearance of inevitability by obscuring the presence of political
and economic contingencies.
This Article takes the liberty of explicating some of the choices
implicit in the structure of the ALI's fiduciary code. It identifies two
potentially conflicting objectives. The drafters chose, on the one
hand, to confirm the legitimacy of corporate fiduciary law's traditional fairness norm. On the other hand, they also chose to mandate a role for business people in the norm's future articulation.
These objectives have a mutually resistant aspect. The drafters, recognizing this, did not attempt to meld them together into a directive
blueprint. Instead, they gathered them into a framework that encourages the mediation of corporate disputes even as it puts them
on a track for legal decision. In addition, they kept the legal description of the corporation that informs the framework flexible and
3
open to situational modification.
The Pinciples, then, give us corporate fiduciary law on an openended foundation. The drafters begin with a traditional fiduciary
norm. They then attempt to avoid problems intrinsic to its imposition in business situations by making normative judgments contextspecific, bringing regulated actors into the judgment process, and
delaying the participation of outside regulators. The question is
whether this strategy privileges self-regulation at the expense of the
traditional fiduciary norm, or strengthens the norm by assuring relational sensitivity in its application. Will the code, by virtue of its
flexibility and capaciousness, help restore confidence in fiduciary
principles? Or will it encourage their marginalization by inviting a
new round of substantive dilution?
The drafters recommend no solution to this problem of self-regulation and normative choice. 4 This Article, taking another liberty,
does make a recommendation. It suggests that traditional fiduciary
norms still play a vital role in corporate governance, and that the
code should be read as an emphatic restatement of those norms.
3. Academic theory is virtually the only thing the drafters exclude from the model.
Both antimanagerialist notions of fiduciary regulation and the microeconomic model of
the corporation are largely absent.
4. The outcome depends on how legal decisionmakers go about applying the code,
assuming they apply it at all. Although nothing requires them to follow it, it probably
will be influential. It is already an authoritative source of fiduciary doctrine, and thus
will exert influence comparable to a leading reference tool. Given the imprecise nature
of fiduciary doctrine, it is therefore well-positioned to influence behavior.
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The code's expansion of business peoples' decisionmaking role
need not, and indeed should not, imply the subordination of the
law's substantive principles.
Part I of the Article summarizes the code and its drafters' commentaries. Part II describes volatile theoretical discussions that
went on in the background while the drafters did their work. It supplements the drafters' commentaries by describing their implicit
choices, and defends their flexible, mediative approach. But the defense leaves open a question-whether the code's flexibility implies
dilution of the fairness standard. Part III addresses this question
and provides a partial answer. It asserts, first, that traditional fiduciary concepts retain vitality in corporate contexts and, second, that
this code should be applied and interpreted to maintain their
integrity.
I.

The Principles' Duty of FairDealing

The Principles impose fiduciary duties on corporate directors, of6
5
ficers, and controlling shareholders in a code of sixteen sections.
This code synthesizes a large body of cases and statutes covering the
traditional range of self-dealing transactions including contracts between directors and officers and the corporation, 7 compensation arrangements," corporate opportunities, 9 and competition with the
corporation.l 0
The code begins by changing the name of this body of law. It
drops the old appellation "duty of loyalty" and substitutes "duty of
fair dealing," drawn from contract law.I The drafters offer a technical explanation for this change: In the class of cases where the
corporate entity is not the beneficiary of the duty, it is not clear to
whom the fiduciary owes the "loyalty" specified in the old title;
changing the title dispels the ambiguity.' 2 This explanation, however, does not satisfy fully. The possibility that the titular change
has substantive implications needs to be addressed.
The code's duty, though newly titled, has deep historical roots. A
traditional fairness concept provides its normative center of gravity.
But the drafters, though they draw on history, express a desire to
break with it. They do not want the traditional fairness concept to
be applied in a traditional conceptual manner. Fiduciary law, they
5. Proposed Final Draft, supra note 1, § 5.01.
6. Id. §§ 5.01-5.16.
7. Id. § 5.02.
8. Id. § 5.03.
9. Id. § 5.04.
10. Id § 5.06.
11. Cf. U.C.C. § 2-103(1)(b) (1989) (defining "good faith," the contract law concept
most closely resembling the duty of loyalty, as "honesty in fact and the observance of
reasonable standards of fair dealing in the trade").
12. Proposed Final Draft, supra note 1, Part V introductory note a, at 264.
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tell us, is not a set of rules that, properly applied, yields precise answers.' 3 Under these "principles" of corporate governance, then,
fairness will not acquire meaning as a matter of deduction from a set
of first principles embedded in legal doctrine; its substantive meaning instead will emerge in particular decisionmaking contexts.
The question is whether the change in tide also heralds a break
with history. Its reference to the fairness standard of contract law
implies a shift away from an externally imposed standard of selflessness to a legal environment more tolerant of self-interested wheeling and dealing. As the discussion that follows shows, some parts of
the code confirm the suggestion of substantive relaxation, while
other parts do not.
A.

Process-The Legal Effect of Disinterested-DirectorApproval

Fiduciary law's traditional fairness standard imposes a norm of
selfless conduct on corporate actors. The Principles' code adopts
that standard, but then retards the norm's imposition by restricting
the scope ofjudicial review. This restriction is another break with
history. Under the present law of most states, the norm may be imposed freely. Access to judicial review is open; absent shareholder
ratification, management self-dealing transactions are subject to direct judicial scrutiny for fairness. 14 The code partially closes this
door to judicial review by introducing a sliding scale of standards of
review keyed to a corporation's internal decision making processes.
The code subjects a transaction between a corporation and a director or officer to full fairness scrutiny with the burden of proof on the
defending officer or director only in cases where the transaction has
not been approved by disinterested directors or disinterested shareholders.15 When disinterested-director or shareholder approval follows full disclosure, the burden of proof shifts to the challenging
plaintiff and the standard of review is restricted. 6 With disinterested-director approval, later judicial review does not go to the
terms of the transaction directly. Instead, the judge reviews the
transaction from the viewpoint of the disinterested director who approved it.17 If the "director reasonably could have concluded that
13. According to the drafters, old phrases like "intrinsic fairness" and "entire fairness" suggest "an often unattainable degree of precision in analysis." Id.
§ 5.02(a)(2)(A) crnt., at 289-92. I impute this purpose to the drafters in the light of the
title change.
14. See id. § 5.02 reporter's note 1, at 312-15 (describing the state statutes).
15. Id § 5.02(a)(1)-(2).
16. Id. § 5.02(b).
17. Unless the action of the approving directors violates the duty of care, the plaintiff will have a damages action only against the interested director. A violative transaction also can be rescinded. Id § 5.02(a)(2)(B) cmt., illus. 9, at 295-96.
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the transaction was fair to the corporation" at the time of authorization, no breach of duty has occurred.18 Ratification by disinterested
shareholders has the same effect as under prior law and further contracts the standard of review to a search for waste of assets. 19
This three-tiered system can be explained in neutral, technical
terms. It rationalizes a longstanding anomaly in the structure of
state law. Most states have safe-harbor statutes for self-dealing
transactions.2 0 Read literally, these statutes shield self-interested
transactions from subsequent challenge for breach of the duty of
loyalty if the proponent obtains disinterested-director or shareholder approval upon full disclosure. Under this literal reading, the
statutes transform fiduciary law into a self-regulatory system: The
regulated entity imposes the norm, and the state enforcement apparatus reviews not the substantive judgment but the circumstances
surrounding its imposition. Courts, however, have not read the
statutes literally. They have consistently construed them to permit
direct judicial review for fairness despite disinterested-director approval. 2 ' This restrictive reading leads to a technical question that
the case law has never answered: If the statutes do not mean what
they seem to say, what then do they mean? The cases leave a bundle
of factors circulating indistinctly-disinterested-director approval,
shareholder approval, fairness scrutiny, waste scrutiny, businessjudgment scrutiny, and different placements and standards of the
burden of proof.2 2 The Principles' code ties these factors into a

working whole.
But the code makes more than just a technical adjustment. By
according qualified recognition to disinterested-director approval,
the code makes a crucial nod in the direction of corporate self-regulation. Disinterested-director approval is the corporate response to
self-dealing transactions most likely to be employed in the ordinary
course of business. Unlike shareholder approval, it is obtainable at
relatively low cost and with limited publicity.23 To accord this process anything approaching preclusive legal effect, however, threatens the integrity of the norm of selfless conduct. Disinterested
18. Id. § 5.02(a)(2)(B).
19. Id. § 5.02(a)(2)(D).
20. Id. § 5.02 reporter's note 1, at 312-15.
21. See, e.g., Scott v. Multi-Amp Corp., 386 F. Supp. 44 (D.NJ. 1974); Aronoff v.
Albanese, 446 N.Y.S.2d 368 (1982); Flieger v. Lawrence, 361 A.2d 218 (Del. 1976);
Remillard Brick Co. v. Remillard-Dandini Co., 241 P.2d 66 (Cal. Ct. App. 1952).
22. Some cases have suggested that the existence of internal corporate approval
processes at least should shift the burden of proof of fairness to the plaintiff. See Proposed Final Draft, supra note 1, § 5.02 reporter's note 1, at 312-15. It also has been
suggested that those processes should change the standard of review to waste, at least
when shareholder ratification has occurred. Id. reporter's note 7, at 321-22. But no
generally accepted legal effect has emerged for disinterested-director ratification. See id.
§ 5.02 reporter's note 1-9, at 312-23; see also Ahmed Bulbulia & Arthur R. Pinto, Statutory
Responses to Interested Directors' Transactions: A Watering Down of FiduciaryStandards?, 53 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 201, 203-04 (1977).

23. For reporting companies under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78-78kk (1988 & Supp. III 1991) (as amended), shareholder ratification requires compliance with the federal proxy rules. See SEC Solicitation of Proxies Rule, 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.14a-2 (1992).
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directors, as colleagues of the interested directors, often approach
self-dealing transactions in a spirit of accommodation.
The code's drafters recognize this problem and search for an intermediate approach.2 4 Their new standard of scrutiny-reasonableness review of the directors' fairness determination-imports
stricter scrutiny than would the business judgment2 5 rule, but also
purports to block full fairness review by the courts.
At bottom, then, the Principles set up a rebuttable presumption in
favor of validating self-dealing transactions approved by disinterested directors. Unfortunately, the drafters do not fix the difficulty
of rebuttal precisely; they leave this task to a case-by-case determination. 2 6 The courts that decide those cases, in effect, will make a
24. See Proposed Final Draft, supra note 1, § 5.02(a)(2)(B) cmt., at 292-300 (stating
that disinterested-director approval upon full disclosure is not the substantive
equivalent of ann's-length transacting).
25. Compare id. § 4.01(c) (3) (phrasing the business judgment rule in terms of rational
belief in the corporation's best interests) with id. § 5.02(a)(2)(B) (stating that a disinterested director approving a self-dealing transaction must reasonably conclude that the
transaction is fair to the corporation). The drafters predict that the erection of a business-judgment shield to protect self-dealing transactions would not work in any event.
In their view, the courts would unduly broaden such a rule in order to scrutinize the
transactions. Id. § 5.02(a)(2)(B) cmt., at 292-300.
26. The code's choice to accord legal effect to boardroom conflict resolution applies
to all types of self-dealing transactions. Id. Part V introductory notes, at 263-70; id
§ 5.01 cmt. c, at 271-72. The particular effect varies with the circumstances. For selfinterested dealings such as contracts with the corporation or personal use of the corporation's property, disinterested-director approval shifts the burden of proof to the challenging party, and the substantive result can be voided only if the approving directors
could not "reasonably have concluded that the transaction was fair to the corporation
.
" Id.....§§ 5.02(a)(2)(B), 5.04(a)(1), 5.04(a)(4), 5.04(b). In cases of executive-compensation arrangements, competition with the corporation, and board decisions to decline corporate opportunities made available by directors or officers interested in their
private pursuit, the code shifts the burden of proof and restricts the reviewing court to
business-judgment scrutiny. Id. §§ 5.03(a)(2), 5.03(b), 5.05(a)(3)(B), 5.05(c), 5.06(a)(2),
5.06(b). In the case of a transaction between a corporation and a controlling shareholder, the effect is more limited: The burden of proof shifts to the challenging party,
id. § 5.10(b), but the standard of scrutiny remains fairness, id. § 5.11 (b).
Under the code, a plaintiff who seeks to invalidate a transaction approved by disinterested directors would be best advised to attack the adequacy of the board-approval process. As a practical matter, a plaintiff must establish that the benefitted party obtained
approval without disclosing a material fact. Id. § 5.02(a)(1); see also id. § 1.14(a) (defining
conflict-of-interest disclosure); id. 1.14(b) (defining transaction disclosure). On its face,
§ 5.02 makes adequate disclosure an independent requirement. Under § 5.02(a)(1), if
the interested party has not made adequate disclosure to the corporate decisionmaker
approving the transaction, the standard is violated without further inquiry into the fairness of the transaction. This formulation is stricter than that contained in many state
statutes. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144(a)(3) (repl. vol. 1991) (stating that adequate disclosure is not required if the suspect transaction is "fair to the corporation").
The Prindpls' drafters, having put forth disclosure as the key to boardroom approximation of an arm's-length bargain, nonetheless draw back from the prospect of questions of liability for breach of duty turning on ex post judicial scrutiny of that
disclosure's adequacy. First, they stress that failure to disclose constitutes grounds for
rescission but does not imply necessarily that the transaction has damaged the corporation. The defendant in such a case still may prove that the transaction was fair, and that
the corporation, accordingly, suffered no damage. See Proposed Final Draft, supra note
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normative choice that the drafters defer. They will determine the
extent to which boardroom regulation of conflict-of-interest transactions entails relaxation of the fiduciary norm.
B.

Fairness
1.

Directors' and Officers' Self-Dealing Contracts

The code's concept of "fairness" is open-ended. The drafters do
not attempt to define the term, presumably intending that its meaning emerge in particular contexts, but they do report some definite
ideas on the subject. The code contemplates "objective" scrutiny of
self-dealing transactions: The deals must fall within the "range of
reasonableness." 2 7 As to contracts between directors and officers
and the corporation, the drafters' draw on antecedent law to suggest
three yardsticks for determining what is reasonable. The first is contractual-the transaction must be compared to an arm's-length
transaction involving the same subject matter. The second looks to
corporate purpose-the transaction must further the corporation's
best interests in the sense of being a transaction into which the corporation would enter even absent the self-interested tie.28 The
third is procedural-the approval process must show no undue
29
pressure or other taint.
Disinterested-director approval relaxes the intensity of the fairness inquiry but does not change its substance. Under the relaxed
standard, the reviewing court must decide that the transaction was
"so clearly outside of the range of reasonableness" that the directors could not have concluded reasonably that it was fair.3 0 This
standard contemplates something stricter than business judgment
review. The code instructs the court conducting the inquiry to make
a critical inspection of the entire record. Assume, for example, that
a director owns a property. The director has marketed the property
for $7.5 million but has only received bids in a range of $3 to $5
million. The director then sells the property to the corporation for
$7.5 million. A disinterested board approves the purchase based on
an expert report which concludes that the property might be worth
$7.5 million but that this sum lies at the high end of the range. The
reviewing court, under the code, may look past the boardroom record and conclude that the approving directors did not have an adequate basis to support their conclusion that the transaction was
1, § 5.02(a)(1) cmt., at 285-88. Furthermore, under § 5.02(c), defective disclosure can
be cured, even after the filing of a suit, by ratification of the transaction after full disclosure. Id. § 5.02(c). The level of scrutiny accorded the transaction after the cure varies
with the culpability of the earlier failure to disclose. If the nondisclosure involved bad
faith, the original approval of the transaction has no legal effect and fairness scrutiny
obtains. In the case of less culpable failures to disclose, the cure may relate back to the
original approval to preclude scrutiny under the fairness standard. See id. § 5.02(c) cmt.,
at 308-12.
27. Id. § 5.02(a)(2)(A) cmt., at 289-92.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. § 5.02(a)(2)(B) cmt., at 292-300.
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reasonable. 31
2.

Other Self-Dealing By Directors and Officers

As to director and officer self-dealing transactions, the code restates the fairness standard of current law but then constrains its
application if disinterested directors sanction the transaction at issue. In treating some other situations, by contrast, the drafters take
steps to compensate for the limited review following disinteresteddirector approval by strengthening the applicable fairness
standards.32
The code's rule respecting uses of corporate property is particularly notable in this regard.3 3 It amounts to an open-ended unjustenrichment standard. Section 5.04 contains a general prohibition
against the use of corporate property, corporate position, or material nonpublic corporate information to secure a pecuniary benefit
31. Id. § 5.02(a)(2)(B) cmt., illus. 9, at 295-96. For a second example, assume that a
disinterested board approves a sale of property to the corporation at a high price based
on an inside appraisal they know to be unreliable and substantially higher than an earlier
outside appraisal. Id, § 5.02(a)(2)(B) cmt., illus. 10, at 296-97. Here too the court can
disregard the corporate record and conclude that the board did not have a basis for
concluding the transaction to be fair.
This fairness inquiry, as articulated with regard to self-dealing contracts, is wellmapped territory. The Principles here restate antecedent substantive law, but depart
from it to restrict the scope of review in deference to disinterested-director determinations.
One other departure from prior law bears mention. The code constructs a new safe
harbor for transactions between companies with common directors absent personal participation or negotiation by the director with the conflict. Id. § 5.07. According to the
comment, only older cases apply fairness scrutiny to these transactions on a per se basis.
Id § 5.07 cmt. a, at 412-13.
This relaxation of the rules attending interlocking boards accords with the spirit of
our times. Interlocking boards were a political issue during the early part of this century, when proponents of industrial and financial cooperation battled proponents of
vigorous antitrust enforcement. See RON CHERNOW, THE HOUSE OF MORGAN: AN AMERICAN BANKING DYNASTY AND THE RISE OF MODERN FINANCE 176-77 (1990) (describing
Louis Brandeis' opposition to interlocking directorates between banks and industrial
corporations). Lately, the tendency is to stress the productive benefits of cooperative
ties. See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson & Mark J. Roe, Understanding theJapaneseKeiretsu: Overlaps
Between Corporate Governance and IndustrialOrganization, 102 YALE LJ. 871, 904-05 (1992)
(describing the productive relationship that rests on "cross-ownership" in Japan).
32. Consider, for example, the Prindples'treatment of corporate opportunities. Proposed Final Draft, supra note 1, § 5.05. This section confirms that fill-time officers have
a duty to present opportunities in those lines of business that the corporation expects to
engage in, as well as in its present lines of business, without regard to the opportunity's
source or the capacity of its acquisition. Id § 5.05(b)(2) (stating that an officer must
"know" that the activity is "closely related" to a business in which the corporation "expects" to engage). Here the drafters opt to follow the stricter rule of Rosenblum v.
Judson Engineering. Corp., 109 A.2d 558, 563 (N.H. 1954) (holding that the corporate
opportunity doctrine applies where the opportunity is such that it should fairly belong to
the corporation), over that of Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939) (holding
the officer to a duty of good faith under the corporate opportunity doctrine).
33. See Proposed Final Draft, supra note 1, § 5.04.
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unless the use falls within listed exceptions.8 4 The rule breaks new
structural ground 5 by synthesizing a range of antecedent cases,
many of which appear to have little in common. For example, the
section's concept of use of property for "pecuniary benefit" encompasses both the sale of a corporate office 3 6 and the act of preventing
the corporation from pursuing an activity that the director desires to
37
pursue for his or her own account.
More controversially, the section makes insider trading a breach
of fiduciary duty. A long line of authority holds that insider trading
does not breach the duty of loyalty because the corporation suffers
no injury.3 8 The drafters reject this approach and draw on the misappropriation theory of federal insider-trading law to apply an unjust-enrichment characterization; the trader uses a corporate
position to secure an unauthorized benefit and therefore breaches
39
the duty of fair dealing.
This treatment of insider trading has paradigmatic implications; it
traverses a distinction long thought fundamental to the structural
model of corporate law. Historically, the duty of loyalty is owed to
the corporate entity and covers conduct pursued in a corporate capacity-that is, in the performance of a directorship or other office-as opposed to conduct pursued in a shareholding capacity.
Transactions in shares fall outside of the traditional scheme of fiduciary duties; a norm of self-interest has prevailed with respect to
shareholder activities. 40 Of course, this classical corporate distinction between corporate-level and shareholder-level activities has
been much modified in some cases, 4 1 but it has nevertheless persisted in the law. The code's drafters break with history to disregard
34. Id. § 5.04(a). The exceptions contemplate, among other things, that uses of corporate property may be qualified as self-dealing transactions through disinterested-director or shareholder approval, or qualified as compensation arrangements. Id.
§ 5.04(a)(1), .04(a)(2), .04(a)(4). The upshot is that the chief executive officer who takes
the corporate jet to a resort for a personal vacation must pay unless the use previously
was included in the corporation's compensation plan as a job perquisite. See id. § 5.04
cmt. d(3), at 368-74.
35. As usual, however, the drafters carefully limit the remedy. Here it is restricted
to the return of the improper benefit and liability for any foreseeable harm to the corporation. Id. § 5.04(c).
36. Id § 5.04 cmt. d(l)(f), at 359.
37. Id. § 5.04 cmt. d(l)(d), at 355-56.
38. See, e.g., Bisbee v. Midland Linseed Prods. Co., 19 F.2d 24, 27-28 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 275 U.S. 564 (1927); Steven v. Hale-Haas Corp., 23 N.W.2d 620, 627-32 (Wis.
1946).
39. Proposed Final Draft, supra note 1, § 5.04 cmt. d(2)(a), at 360-64; see Diamond v.
Oreamuno, 248 N.E.2d 910, 912 (N.Y. 1969). But see Freeman v. Decio, 584 F.2d 186
(7th Cir. 1978) (rejecting the misappropriation theory under Florida law).
40. The self-interest norm is embedded in the rule that controlling shareholders can
sell their shares at a premium, above-market price without sharing with other shareholders. See, e.g., Zetlin v. Hanson Holdings, Inc., 397 N.E.2d 287 (N.Y. 1979). For the
classic statement of the self-interest norm with respect to the vote, see Ringling Bros.Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows v. Ringling, 53 A.2d 441 (Del. 1947) ("a shareholder
may exercise wide liberality ofjudgment in the matter of voting, and it is not objectionable that his motives may be for personal profit").
41. See infra note 59.
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it entirely. Their "duty of fair dealing" is owed to both the corporation and its shareholders 4 2 and thus cuts across the old categories.
One result is that inside information easily can be characterized as
corporate property, and its use in trading can become a breach of
43
duty without a corporate-level injury.
3.

ShareholderFreezeouts as DirectorSelf-Dealing

The code's elimination of the classical distinction between corporate- and shareholder-level duties necessitates structural adjustments. Primary among them is the inclusion of manipulation-ofdividend policy as one of the unfair uses of "corporate position"
under section 5.04. Purposeful distribution of a benefit to shareholders qua shareholders by means other than payment of dividends
violates the section if some shareholders are unable to take advantage of the benefit.4 4 The result is that close-corporation
freezeouts, historically thought to give rise to breaches of duty at
the shareholder level, fall into the same category as director and
officer breaches. As with insider trading, the drafters relax the historical requirement of injury to the corporation. The prohibited
combination of earnings retention and unequal distribution of employment benefits causes the corporate entity no harm. The gravamen of the breach is injury to the shareholder by virtue of unequal
distribution of benefits.
It should be noted that this treatment of freezeout transactions
does not break new ground by changing the results of cases. The
shareholder-level duty is now well-established. The drafters innovate, however, by implying that equal treatment of shareholders is a
norm of equal dignity with the notion of loyalty to the corporation
as a whole. 45 Although they do not expand or intensify the notion
of fairness operating in present law expressly, the drafters clear a
46
path that invites such results in future cases.
42. Proposed Final Draft, supra note 1, § 5.04 cmt. d(2)(a), at 360-64.
43. Section 5.04's rules against the use of corporate information for personal benefit balance the individual insider's interests in profitmaking pursuits against the firm's
collective interest. Under § 5.04(a) (3), corporate information generally may not be used
for personal advantage unless (a) it is not inside information used in the trading of the
firm's securities, (b) it is not information designated as proprietary by the corporation,
or (c) its use does not harm the corporation. Id. § 5.04(a)(3). Thus, an employee may
use corporate information in formulating a personal investment strategy, or may use
nonproprietary information when taking employment elsewhere. See id. § 5.04 cmt.
d(2)(b), at 364-68.
Interestingly, under the code's unjust enrichment theory of insider trading, tipping is
not a breach of duty per se. A breach occurs only if the tipper takes a cut of the tippee's
profits, or if the corporation incurs costs as a result of an SEC enforcement proceeding.
Id. § 5.04 cmt. d(2)(b), illus. 17, at 367.
44. Id. § 5.04 cmt. d(1)(c), at 353-55.
45. See also supra text accompanying notes 40-43.
46. The Pinciples' treatment of the creditors' interest in the corporation makes a
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4.

Duties of ControllingShareholders

A substantive corporate-level/shareholder-level distinction does
survive in the code. The code applies different procedures and fairness standards depending on the capacity in which the corporate
actors act. Freezeouts are treated as corporate-level breaches be-

cause they result from the use of corporate property or office by
directors or officers. In the freezeout fact pattern, the culpable directors and officers are also controlling shareholders, and the unequal distribution that violates their duty occurs at the shareholder
level. But these culpable players do not undertake the breaching
actions in a shareholding capacity.
Where a controlling shareholder interacts directly with the corporation-for example, where a parent corporation contracts or interferes with a majority-owned subsidiary-the code treats the case as a
separate suspect transaction. 4 7 It sets out standards for three such
notable point of contrast. The drafters take "no position" on the matter of corporate
duties to creditors. Id. § 5.04 cmt. c(l), at 341-43. They acknowledge that some observers favor a duty to creditors, but note that Part V "does not treat" the matter as such,
leaving creditor protection to contract and bankruptcy law. Id § 5.04 reporter's note
12, at 376-77; see also id. § 5.04 cmt. d(2)(a), at 364 (noting that Part V does not address
trading in debt securities).
The drafters show only slightly more solicitude for the interests of preferred stockholders. So long as the directors do not advance personal pecuniary interests, the drafters would accord deference to the directors' decision to favor one class of preferred
stock over another with respect to dividends or redemption. Failure to respect contract
rights should result in a contract claim, not a claim for breach of fiduciary duty. Id
§ 5.04 reporter's note 7, at 376. Zahn v. TransAmerica Corp., 162 F.2d 36 (3d Cir.
1947), is carefully limited: Controlling shareholders have a duty not to use corporate
property in a manner that excludes other "similarly situated" shareholders from participation in profits. Proposed Final Draft, supra note 1, § 5.11 cmt. d(1)(d), at 355-56; id.
reporter's note 7.
There is sufficient similarity between bonds, preferred stock, and common stockviewed from the point of view of investors-to make the drafters' distinction hard to
defend. See generally William W. Bratton Jr., CorporateDebt Relationships: Legal Theory in a
Time of Restructuring, 1989 DUKE L.J. 92, 98-101 (identifying three conceptions of corporate debt relationships and evaluating their role in response to restructuring related
wealth transfers); Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Fairness Rights of Corporate Bondholders, 65
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1165, 1167-71 (1990) (examining the nature of corporate fiduciary relationships in the context of bondholders' rights). The remission of the question of equal
treatment of preferred stock to the category of business judgment matters is particularly
surprising in view of the warmth with which the drafters embrace the idea of equal treatment of common stockholders in § 5.04. Nor does the device of "taking no position" on
the subject of duties to creditors seem effective for its intended purpose. Even as they
refrain from articulating a position, the Principlesstrongly imply that senior-security protection should be a contractual proposition.
This treatment of senior securities strikes a dissonant note in the code. So far as
shareholder-to-shareholder relationships are concerned, the drafters rework the law's
very structure to embed in it a fairness principle previously articulated in a small but
important body of cases. Senior-security holders are remitted to their contract rights
without discussion, even though they suffer many of the same problems of nonreciprocal
treatment and unanticipated opportunism. Moreover, at least where close corporations
are concerned, shareholders have as much opportunity to protect themselves by contract as do bondholders. See infra Part I.B.4.
Of course, lines do have to be drawn, and the code's line accords with the views of the
overwhelming majority of observers. See, e.g., Victor Brudney, Corporate Bondholders and
Debtor Opportunism: In Bad Times and Good, 105 HARv. L. REV. 1821 (1992);John C. Coffee, Jr., Unstable Coalitions: Corporate Governance as a Multi-Player Game, 78 GEO. LJ. 1495
(1990). So noting, however, does not make the line any less arbitrary.
47. See infra notes 51-53 and accompanying text. These sections substantiate the

1094

[VOL. 61:1084

Bratton
THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

situations. First, for transactions between a controlling shareholder
and the corporation, it articulates a fairness standard.48 Second,
carrying forward the principle of section 5.04, it rules that a controlling shareholder may not use corporate property or its control position to secure a pecuniary benefit unless value is given and the
transaction is fair, or the benefit is made proportionately available to
other shareholders. 49 Finally, it extends a modified version of the
50
corporate-opportunity rule to controlling shareholders.
Judicial scrutiny here is stricter than elsewhere in the code. The
basic test is fairness, without provision for an automatic reduction in
scrutiny upon approval by disinterested directors. 5 1 The drafters
apparently assume that parents so control their subsidiaries' board
rooms as to make pointless a provision for corporate-level input on
the question of fair treatment. But, drawing on Weinberger v. UOP,
Inc.,5 2 the drafters indicate that procedural considerations still will
figure into judicial fairness determinations in these cases. The
starting point for procedural fairness here, however, is not disinterested-director approval, but the stronger check of the independent
53
negotiating committee.
The drafters thus make it harder to qualify these transactions procedurally. They go on, however, to compensate for this stricture by
narrowing the substantive scope of the underlying duty. The controlling shareholders' duty, if articulated as an exact parallel of the
directors' and officers' duty imposed by the code, would prove monumentally inconvenient to parent corporations. For example, the
holdings of leading majority-to-minority shareholder cases like Jones v. H.F. Ahmanson
& Co., 460 P.2d 464 (Cal. 1969), Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717 (Del. 1971),
and Greene & Co. v. Dunhill International, Inc., 249 A.2d 427 (Del. Ch. 1968).
The fairness duty obtains even though in the case of a controlling corporate shareholder the managers making the decisions owe conflicting fiduciary duties to a second
set of shareholders. Proposed Final Draft, supra note 1, § 5.10 cmt. f, at 443-45.
48. Proposed Final Draft, supra note 1, § 5.10(a).
49. Id- § 5.11(a)(1)-(2). Section 5.11 sweeps in most majority-to-minority fact patterns not involving transactions. It covers, among other things, the parent's (a) misusing a corporate position to obtain a tax benefit at a subsidiary's expense, (b) misusing
dividend policy, (c) precluding a subsidiary from engaging in a business opportunity, (d)
precluding a subsidiary from competing with a parent, and (e) obtaining profit from the
sale of property to the exclusion of other shareholders. See id. § 5.11 cmt. a, at 448-50.
50. Id- § 5.12(a). This section's definition of corporate opportunity is narrower than
that in § 5.05(b) because the drafters assume that controlling shareholders have a right
to engage in competition with controlled corporations. Id- § 5.12 cmt. d, at 471-77. As
a practical matter, then, this corporate opportunity bar extends only to opportunities
developed by a subsidiary and opportunities that come to a parent corporation by virtue
of its relation to the subsidiary. Id. § 5.12(b)(1), (2).
51. Id. § 5.10(a)(2),(b) (stating that disinterested-director ratification of control
shareholder engagenent with corporation shifts burden of proof but does not change
standard of review); id. § 5.12(a)(2) (stating that disinterested-shareholder ratification is
necessary to insulate control shareholder from taking of corporate opportunity).
52. 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983).
53. Proposed Final Draft, supra note 1, § 5.10 cmt. e, at 440-43.
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parent would have to channel significant business opportunities to
the subsidiary 54 and would be constrained from competing with it.5 5
Mandated selflessness of this intensity would as a practical matter
encourage the parent to eliminate the conflict of interest by means
of a cash-out merger of the minority shares.5 6 The code's drafters
draw the line before this point is reached. Although the controlling
shareholder/parent may not prevent the subsidiary from competing
with it, it has no duty to provide the subsidiary with the resources
needed for competition, and, indeed, may compete with the subsidiary to its injury. 57 Similarly, the corporate-opportunity bar applied
to controlling shareholders is defined narrowly. 58
5. Sales of Control
The code's constraints on the use of corporate position for personal gain invite application to a case where a controlling shareholder sells stock at a premium price. Because such a sale
customarily entails stage-managed changes in board composition
and office holding, it arguably involves the "use" of corporate positions. If further reference is made to the code's principle of equal
distribution of benefits among shareholders, then a basis arises for
imposing premium participation rights for outside shareholders
upon the sale of a control block. 59 But here again, the drafters carefully draw a line against the extension of their own equality principle. Under Section 5.16, premium sales of controlling blocks
constitute a breach of a duty to other shareholders only in two nar60
rowly defined classes of cases.
54. Cf id. § 5.05(b).
55. Cf id. § 5.06(a).
56. Cf Victor Brudney & Robert C. Clark, A New Look at Corporate Opportunities, 94
HARV. L. REV. 997, 1057-1058 (1981) (proposing a sharing rule for these situations as a
means to encourage cash-out mergers).
57. Proposed Final Draft, supra note 1, § 5.11 cmt. c(1), at 450-52; id. c(2)(B), at
453-55; id. d(1)(a), at 457-59.
58. See supra note 50.
59. Such a system was, of course, advocated by a generation of commentators. The
primary exposition is William D. Andrews, The Stockholder's Right to EqualOpportunity in the
Sale of Shares, 78 HARV. L. REV. 505, 515-17 (1965). For support, see Victor Brudney,
FiduciaryIdeology in Transactions Affecting Corporate Control, 65 MIcH. L. REV. 259, 296-99
(1966). For a more pointed antimanagerialist view of the case, see Richard W.Jennings,
Trading in Corporate Control, 44 CAL. L. REV. 1, 29-31 (1956) (arguing that a controlling
shareholder who sells at a premium should forfeit that premium to the corporation).
For a philosophical statement of the case, see David C. Bayne, A Philosophy of Corporate
Control, 112 U. PA. L. REV. 22 (1963).

The suggestion of a sharing rule has been vigorously contested. See, e.g., Frank H.
Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions, 91 YALE L.J. 698, 705-37
(1982). For a suggestion that the existing cases do an effectivejob of separating harmful
and beneficial transfers, see Einer Elhauge, The Triggering Function of Sale of Control Doctrine, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 1465 (1992).

60. The first case arises when the purchaser also solicits sales from other holders.
The shareholder selling the control block breaches a duty if it makes no disclosure of its
transaction because of the risk that it might attempt to persuade the other shareholders
to sell on less advantageous terms. Proposed First Draft, supra note 1, § 5.16 cmt. d, at
506-07. This is the rule of Brown v. Halbert, 76 Cal. Rptr. 781 (1969), without dicta
about equal opportunity. The second case arises if it is "apparent from the circumstances" that the purchaser is likely to violate a duty of fair dealing in such a way as to

1096

[VOL. 61:1084

Bratton
THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

The drafters follow precedent here. 61 But in so doing, they align
themselves on one side of a long-running academic dispute about
the implications of the traditional fairness standard.6 2 This circumstance prompts the drafters to explain their normative choice, a rare
event in their commentaries. The premium paid in these transactions, they say, might have multiple sources. The purchaser might
intend to pay either for the opportunity to improve the company's
management or for the opportunity to exploit the position
purchased. The drafters presume in favor of improved management. They rely on a pair of empirical studies of control sales that
show that the stock prices of the unsold minority blocks rise slightly
following a sale. 63 They determine, in effect, that control sales do
not injure nonparticipating shareholders and may enhance their
investments.
This empirical position remains open to debate.6a Given the
countervailing policy of shareholder equality that pervades the
code, one senses a need for a fuller explanation. Interestingly, the
policy that fills the bill is a policy that the drafters disavow expressly:
The encouragement of transactions in the market for corporate control. 6 5 That policy stems from efficiency considerations 6 6-considerations notably absent from the drafters' commentary in Part V.67
obtain a significant financial benefit. Proposed Final Draft, supra note 1, § 5.16 cmt. e, at
509. This is, of course, a careful abstraction of the rule of Perlman v. Feldmann, 219
F.2d 173 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 952 (1955).
61. See, e.g., Clagget v. Hutchison, 583 F.2d 1259, 1262 (4th Cir. 1978); Zetlin v.
Hanson Holdings, Inc., 397 N.E.2d 387, 388-89 (N.Y. 1979).
62. See supra note 2.
63. Proposed Final Draft, supra note 1, § 5.16 cmt. c, at 504-06; id. reporter's note 1,
at 513-15. The studies are Michael Bradley, Interfirm Tender Offers and the Marketfor Corporate Control, 53J. Bus. 345 (1980), and Clifford G. Holderness & Dennis P. Sheehan, The
Role of Majority Shareholders in Publicly Held Corporations, 20J. FIN. ECON. 317 (1988).
64. In showing that the stock of the noncontrolling shareholders does not decline in
value around the time of the sale, the studies do not foreclose the possibility that the
noncontrolling shareholders nevertheless bear an exploitation cost in connection with
the sale.
65. Part VI, directed to transactions in control and tender offers, begins with the
admonition that it reflects no 'judgment on the economic, social and political issues
posed by hostile takeovers." Proposed Final Draft, supra note 1, Part VI introductory
note, at 517-23.
66. Under generally accepted theory, the threat of a hostile control transfer reduces
agency costs by encouraging better management performance. The transfer transaction, moreover, moves the assets to a higher-valuing user, and-absent a controlling
shareholder and given a competitive market-the shareholders participate pro rata in
most of the value increase. See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE EcoNOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 171-74 (1991).
67. Corporate control policy also shapes a companion rule directed to management
buyouts-transactions in which the corporation's managers purchase a control block
from public shareholders either by a negotiated merger or by a tender offer. The code
treats these transactions in the same manner as it does control-shareholder engagements. A safe harbor is available, but only if the management group gives the market an
opportunity for free play respecting control of the corporation. This "market check"
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C. Opting Out
The Principles' fiduciary standards, like those under present state
law, are for the most part mandatory. The code explicitly constrains
the power of individual corporations to vary the duty's terms and to
promulgate their own less rigorous standards.68 The drafters thus
make a basic assumption that free contract does not operate in the
world of corporate governance.
The code does accord corporations a limited freedom to promulgate their own "standards." These can specify self-dealing transactions, uses of property, or business opportunities, and provide
69
advance permission for their undertaking by officers and directors.
Convenience is the stated rationale. 70 The drafters aspire to open a
field for the easy synchronization of the legal governance model and
the practice of the individual firm. But they remain protective of the
legal model's integrity. A grant of advance permission should not
imply abandonment of oversight by the board, say the drafters.71
Nor should individual firms be permitted to "dispense generally
with or2 generally modify" the code's substantive and procedural
rules.7
involves the strictest procedural rules in Part V. Management must make public disclosure and must give interested parties relevant information and a reasonable opportunity
to submit a competing proposal, and disinterested shareholders must ratify the transaction. In addition, disinterested directors must oversee the market offering process. See
id. § 5.15 cmt. c(3), at 492-99.
The fairness standard here is the arm's length bargain, but in a stricter version. Garden-variety self-dealing transactions of directors and officers can qualify based on hypothetical reference to market transactions; the insider does not have to submit to the
possibility of being outbid. Here, qualification of the transaction presupposes an actual
opportunity for outside third parties to outbid the insider. Id. § 5.15 (b)(1). These strict
standards presumably stem from recognition of the importance of management buyout
transactions to the shareholder beneficiaries of the duty. The whole company, after all,
is being sold. But this immediate shareholder interest in the highest price does not
provide a complete explanation. Ordinary self-dealing transactions conceivably can
have a very significant bearing on corporate performance and shareholder returns, but
do not require a "market check." Moreover, in the case of insider sales of control-as
opposed to insider purchases of control-the fact that control has gone onto the block
does not give rise to enough concern about shareholder participation to cause the
drafter to shape an aggressive fiduciary rule.
For a complete explanation, a policy favoring free play of the corporate control market and an attendant long-run vision of shareholder interest must be inferred. Management buyouts are transactions in that market, but are unlikely to realize maximum
returns for shareholders. The management purchasers have a defensive incentive to
initiate the transaction. They control its timing and have power to withhold information
from potential competing bidders. To the extent they can exercise these powers with
impunity, the scope and disciplinary effect of the market for corporate control diminishes. For discussion of the dangers of management buyouts, see generally Deborah
DeMott, Puzzles and Parables: Defining Good Faith in the MBO Context, 25 WAKE FOREST L.
REv. 15, 31-34 (1990) (providing examples of bad faith behavior of management during
management buyouts), and Dale A. Oesterle &Jon R. Norberg, Management Buyouts: CreatingorAppropriatingShareholder Wealth?, 41 VAND. L. REv. 207, 218-22 (1988) (describing
potential for abuse in management buyouts).
68. Proposed Final Draft, supra note 1, § 5.09.
69. Id.
70. Id. § 5.09 cmt. a, at 423-24.
71. Id. § 5.09 cmt. c, at 424-30.
72. Id § 5.09 cmt. d, at 430-35.
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D.

Summary

On one level, the code restates existing law. The drafters for the
most part stay close to the existing body of case rulings. But they
superimpose new structural principles on the law's existing pattern.
The new principles send mixed normative signals. By institutionalizing disinterested-director approval, they make fiduciary regulation
a matter of internal corporate governance. This adjustment implies
that the values of business people will henceforth determine the
content of "fairness," with dilutive substantive results. On another
level, the drafters reject the proposition that contractual choice
should prevail over the law's fiduciary norm in corporate contexts.
They also raise shareholder-level fairness duties, once the exception
in corporate law, to a status of equal dignity with director and officer
duties. These steps imply that the meaning of "fairness" is still up
to lawmakers to determine, and that stricter applications of the
norm may be legitimate.
The rest of this Article identifies and resolves some of the tensions created by these mixed normative signals.
I.

TraditionalFiduciary Law, Corporate Governance Policy, and
the Choices that Shape the Principles' Fiduciary Code

The code's drafters make no sustained attempt either to explain
why we have fiduciary duties or to justify their own formulations.
They do not refer to efficiency considerations. They do not refer to
a need for management disempowerment. Nor do they refer to an
ethic of self-sacrifice or a similar value-laden concept. In general,
they take fiduciary duty, and a constituent notion ofjustice as fairness, as given.
The drafters do make a few telling comments. Cumulated, these
amount to a tender of a beginning of an explanation. An executive
who takes the corporate jet on personal business should pay, they
say, because shareholders have a "right to expect" payment of fair
value. 73 This implies an assumption that "shareholder expectations" explain and justify corporate fiduciary law. Unfortunately,
the drafters say nothing about their basis for assuming the empirical
''expectations" on which the justification relies.
Elsewhere, the drafters tell us that the code's mandatory aspect is
a consequence of "public policy." They observe that the shareholders cannot foresee the consequences of broad-brush waivers; there74
fore, their informed consent to them cannot be assumed.
Restating this point, the drafters assume that corporate governance
73. Id. § 5.04 cmt. d(3), at 368-74.
74. Id. § 5.09 cmt. d(2), at 433-35.
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is not a field well-suited to free contract; therefore, "public policy"
requires it to be regulated. Unfortunately, we are left to ourselves
to determine the origins and content of this "public policy." We
also are left on our own to apply the policy to support the particular
regulations adopted by the drafters.
This part of this Article begins the job of filling in the explanation
omitted by the drafters. First, it describes discussions about the nature and scope of fiduciary duty that went on in the background at
the time the code was drafted. Second, it considers the code against
this background and isolates the theoretical choices implicit in the
drafters' work. These are, first, the choice of an open-ended description of the corporation, and, second, the choice of a mediative
normative framework.
A.

The Loss of Confidence in CorporateFiduciary Law

The Principles' fiduciary code appears at the end of a period of
dispute over the nature and justification of corporate fiduciary duties. This dispute addressed an old problem that inheres in all discussions of fiduciary law.
Fiduciary relationships present a problem of legal classification.
They lie in a gray area between the more clearly defined worlds of
government regulation and private ordering through contract.
They plausibly can be characterized as a species of either. Because
the fiduciary acts on another's behalf,7 5 the relationship implies a
beneficiary needing protective regulation. But fiduciary relationships also are volitional7 6 and inevitably entail a measure of private
ordering, in many cases a large measure. As a result, the same fiduciary relationship may be the subject of two sharply contrasting descriptions with contrasting normative implications. Depending on
the factors emphasized, either legally mandated self-sacrifice or unconstrained pursuit of self-interest in an environment of free contract may be implied.
Disagreement over these choices pervades recent discussions of
77
corporate fiduciary law. This academic story briefly can be retold.
1.

TraditionalFiduciary Law and Antimanagerialist Corporate Policy

Traditional fiduciary law favors beneficiary protection over fiduciary volition. The doctrinal literature asserts, plausibly enough, that
a legal constraint against self-dealing is implicit in the structure of
75. See generally 1 AUSTIN W. ScoTT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS 43 (4th ed. 1987) (defining
the fiduciary's role in terms of action for the benefit of another party as to matters within
the relationship's scope).
76. The fiduciary accepts a power on condition that it be exercised in the beneficiary's interests. J.C. Shepherd, Towards a Unified Concept of Fiduciary Relationships, 97 LAW
Q. REV. 51, 75 (1981). In the case of agency relationships, the acceptance ripens into
express agreement. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 13 cmt. a (1958).
77. For a more detailed retelling, see William W. Bratton, Self Interest and Good
Will in Corporate Fiduciary Law (Nov. 1992) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
author).
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fiduciary relationships. These relationships-characterized by action on another party's behalf and power in the acting party accompanied by dependence on the other's part 7 8 -have qualitatively
different premises than relationships in the world of private ordering. 79 Accordingly, classical contract law, which assumes pure selfinterest on the part of contracting actors,8 0 cannot provide an appropriate regulatory framework. The doctrinal result is a black-letter line separating contract from fiduciary law.
The traditional commentary justifies the imposition of the fiduciary's legal duty on two grounds. One is ethical-fiduciary exercise
of power for self-interested reasons is wrong. The ethic can be
stated positively or negatively. In the positive statement, the ethical
fiduciary acts out of good will toward the beneficiary. In the negative statement, the ethical fiduciary abjures self-interested pursuits.8 1 The other justification is practical-the imposition of the
duty facilitates productive relationships, whether of trust or of
agency.
These traditional fiduciary principles present special problems
when applied in corporate contexts. The basic relational fit is easy:
The corporate manager takes the fiduciary role, exercising power
that affects the interests of a dependent shareholder-beneficiary.
The problem is that the fit is never perfect. In business situations,
wealth creation can be as much a matter of entrepreneurial initiative
as a matter of performance of a trust. Corporate relationships are
driven by self-interest, present on all sides and known to all
participants.
The corporate version of the duty of loyalty recognizes the possibility of legitimate, self-interested conduct by those in charge of corporations at the same time that it burdens them with a standard of
self-sacrifice. To this end, it moderates the standard of selflessness
upon the performance of qualifying procedures.8 2 The procedures,
in theory, move the transaction out of the relational framework of
power and dependence toward arm's-length dealing. The Principles,
78. See Shepherd, supra note 76, at 68-69; ErnestJ. Weinrib, The FiduciaiyObligation,
25 U. TORONTO LJ. 1, 4 (1975).
79. The fact that many fiduciary relationships arise out of planned transactions does
not obviate this point. Weinrib, supra note 78, at 3; see also Tamar Frankel, FiduciaryLaw,
71 CAL. L. REV. 795, 798 (1983) (stating that fiduciary relationships combine qualities of
bargained-for contracts with a form of the power and dependence of status relations).
80. Restating the point in Macneillian terms, it enhances discreetness and presentation normatively. IAN R. MACNEIL, THE NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT: AN INQUIRY INTO MODERN CONTRACTUAL RELATIONs 59-64 (1980).
81. For an extended discussion of the traditional commentary, see generally Bratton, supra note 77.
82. The initial modification occurred at the turn of the century. See ROBERT C.
CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 160-66 (1986); Harold Marsh, Jr., Are Directors Trustees? Conflict
of Interest and CorporateMorality, 22 Bus. LAW. 35, 36-40, 43 (1966). The Principles offer,
in effect, a state-of-the-art presentation of the modified body of rules.
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as we have seen, ratify and expand this approach, enhancing the
83
legal effect accorded the judgment of the approving board.
This model of accommodation is a topic of continuing disagreement. Its supporters take the position that a stricter trust model of
fiduciary duty makes no sense in business contexts and that this accommodation is a reasonable solution to a special regulatory problem. To the model's antimanagerialist detractors, contingent
fiduciary duties are a part of a larger, unsatisfactory legal system of
corporate governance.
The antimanagerialist attack proceeds as follows. Because public
shareholders cannot as a practical matter control managers through
the franchise, managers exercise their considerable power absent an
adequate mechanism to assure accountability. Without an assur84
ance of accountability, efficient production will not be achieved.
Relaxed fiduciary standards contribute to this governance problem.
The system's procedures for qualifying self-interested managerial
conduct are intrinsically ineffective because the managers control all
internal decisionmaking processes in fact if not in name. Furthermore, investors expect a firm base of legal protection as a condition
for parting with their capital. Strong fiduciary law supports this expectation, lowering the cost of capital and thus performing an efficiency function.8 5
This antimanagerialist case for heightened corporate fiduciary
regulation bears a family resemblance to the traditional doctrinal
justification for all fiduciary duties. Both approaches lead to the
same conclusion-that a strong conceptual barrier should be erected to separate fiduciary and ordinary contract relationships. But
the overlap is not complete. The corporate case rests on a practical
imperative-the need to protect investors. That imperative in turn
depends on a particular picture of corporate power allocation and
governance policy. The traditional story, in contrast, combines a
similar practical imperative with an ethical justification for fiduciary
self-sacrifice. The latter justification does not usually figure into
86
these corporate discussions.
2.

Corporate Law Under a Rational Expectations Paradigm

The introduction of a microeconomic model of the corporation in
83. See supra text accompanying notes 14-19.
84. This is the problem of the separation of ownership and control, identified in
ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROP-

ERTY (1932), and discussed ever since.
85. See, e.g., Marvin A. Chirelstein, Towards A FederalFiduciary StandardsAct, 30 CLEv.
ST. L. REV. 203, 218-19 (1981) (arguing that investors assume a high level of protection); David M. Phillips, ManagerialMisuse of Property: The Synthesizing Thread in Corporate
Doctrine, 32 RUTGERS L. REV. 184, 219-20 (1979) (stating that fulfilling expectations
reduces costly uncertainty). See generally Bratton, supra note 77.
86. The custom is to dismiss fiduciary law's tendency to speak in moral terms as a
rhetorical phenomenon. See Robert C. Clark, Agency Costs Versus FiduciaryDuties, in PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS: THE STRUCTURE OF BUSINESS 75 (John W. Pratt & Richard J.
Zeckhauser eds., 1985). For a contrary approach, see Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Death of
Fiduciary Duty in Close Corporations, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1675, 1692-99 (1990).
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the early 1980s countered the antimanagerial case for intensified fiduciary controls. The economic model discards the doctrinal distinction between contract and fiduciary relationships. It assumes
that individual self-interest motivates all relationships, whatever
their traditional legal classification.8 7 Self-interested conduct, as a
result, does not automatically prompt normative disapproval. All
corporate actors become rational figures who take contractual steps
to protect themselves. Thus modeled, shareholders do not necessarily expect strict legal protection under the fiduciary rubric. Instead, they primarily rely on competition in the market for corporate
control and the market for executive skills to assure protection of
their interests.
Under the economic model, fiduciary duties do not inhere in corporate relationships. Under its picture of universal contracting, no
intrinsic need for legal regulation may be presumed. Legal duties
can be justified only by showing that private actors given full information in a costless contracting environment would have agreed to
them. 8 8 Fiduciary rules thus are reconstituted as contractual gapfillers. By implication, they should yield to contrary agreement or
"opting out" by the actors in a particular corporation.
This theoretical challenge to mandatory fiduciary duties was exhaustively discussed in the law reviews. In the end, the commentary
confirmed the mandate's legitimacy. It was decided that process defects make the corporate charter amendment-the means to the end
of opting out-an inappropriate context for complete freedom of
contract, even when viewed through the lens of an economic model.
Shareholders have a collective-action problem when managers propose charter amendments. Small stakes make it irrational for individual holders to invest in information acquisition.8 9 Moreover,
managers, by virtue of their control of the structure and timing of
the amendment process, easily can turn the shareholder's inferior
87. This model caused an abrupt change in the political economics of corporate law
during the 1980s. It tells the story of corporate organization in terms of the voluntary
and purposeful interaction of rational free actors in a competitive environment. It was
first articulated in Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 310 (1976). For the
leading legal application, see EASTERBROOK & FisCHEL, supra note 66. For a purer legal
application of the model, see Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, Opting Out of Fiduciary
Duties: A Response to the Anti-Contractarians, 65 WASH. L. REv. 1 (1990).

88. See, e.g., EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 66, at 15; Jeffrey N. Gordon, The
Mandatory Structure of Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 1549, 1550-51 (1989). The
reconception of corporate relationships in terms of microeconomic agency relationships
causes many of the injuries recognized by corporate and securities law to disappear. See,
e.g., Jonathan R. Macey, From Fairness to Contract: The New Direction of the Rules Against
Insider Trading, 13 HOFsTRA L. REV. 9, 10-11 (1984).
89. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., No Exit?: Opting Out, the ContractualTheory of the Corporation, and the Special Case of Remedies, 53 BROOK. L. REV. 919, 933-35 (1988); Gordon,
supra note 88, at 1575-77.
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negotiating position to advantage. 90 The result is a contract failure:
The shareholders rationally vote to approve an amendment that is
value decreasing to them. Accordingly, broad-brush abolitions of
fiduciary duties by charter amendments sometimes should be subject to mandatory regulation even under a microeconomic paradigm. 9 ' As noted above, the drafters of the Principles draw on this
92
rationale to justify the code's constraint on opting out.
The microeconomic model of corporate law thus failed to accomplish a deregulatory policy mission. But its methodology did succeed in becoming the ordinary framework for evaluating corporate
law problems. The academic ratification of mandatory fiduciary
duty was articulated in a rational-expectations format. Traditional
notions of power, dependence, and ethical constraint did not figure
into the discussion.
Fiduciary law emerged from this debate in a weakened theoretical
posture.9 3 Although few scholars today view corporate governance
as a matter of contract success, most nevertheless view it as a species
of contracting problem. Legal intervention, in turn, has come to
be viewed as a less than satisfactory solution. From a rationalexpectations point of view, the shareholder plaintiff in an action for
breach of fiduciary duty is every bit as much an opportunist as the
management defendant.9 4 Moreover, the "shareholder expectations" that once justified legal intervention now look much different. The efficient market hypothesis and the capital asset pricing
model highlight pathways for partial shareholder self-protection; 9 5
shareholders who can protect themselves to some extent presumably "expect" less in the way of legal protection. 96 In addition, the
90. Gordon, supra note 88, at 1577-84. Professor Coffee stressed this problem of
"agenda manipulation" over the rational apathy story. He pointed out that shareholders easily can just say no, but that management's ability to manipulate the agenda stilts
the whole corporate contracting process. John C. Coffee, Jr., The Mandatory/Enabling
Balance in CorporateLaw: An Essay on theJudicialRole, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1618, 1674-75 &
n.234 (1989).
91. Under the consensus view, the amendment process is deemed reliable for
amendments that are company-specific and transaction-specific-for example, poison
pills or stock option plans. But for general, open-ended proposals-for example, broadbrush abolition of director and officer fiduciary duties-contract failure is probable. See
Coffee, supra note 90, at 1664-65; Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Structure of CorporationLaw,
89 COLUM. L. REV. 1461, 1469-70 (1989); Gordon, supra note 88, at 1593-97; Robert B.
Thompson, The Law's Limits on Contracts in a Corporation, 15J. CORP. L. 377, 388 (1990).
92. See supra text accompanying note 74.
93. For a recent inspection of the whole body of fiduciary law from a rational-expectations perspective, see Robert Cooter & BradleyJ. Freedman, The FiduciaryRelationship:
ItsEconomic Characterand Legal Consequences, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1045 (1991).
94. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 66, at 99-100; Jason S. Johnston, Opting

In and Opting Out: Bargainingfor Fiduciary Duties in Cooperative Ventures, 70 WASH. U. L.Q
291, 312-320 (1992).
95. For discussion of these theories and their limitations as a basis for normative
decisions, see Donald C. Langevoort, Theories, Assumptions, and Securities Regulation: Market Efficiency Revisited, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 851 (1992).
96. The capital asset pricing model asserts that, because investors can diversify unsystematic risk from their portfolios, they only will be rewarded for bearing market risk.
See VICTOR BRUDNEY & WILLIAM W. BRArON, BRUDNEY AND CHIRELSTEIN'S CASES AND
MATERIALS ON CORPORATE FINANCE 98-112 (4th ed. 1993). The inference arises that

investors can protect themselves from breaches of fiduciary duty; because management
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proportion of institutional shareholding has increased, and some
institutional representatives have become active and even intermittently effective in corporate governance. Shareholders consequently appear less and less well-suited to the victim's role. It no
longer seems safe to assume that mandatory self-abnegation among
managers promotes investor confidence and lowers the cost of capital. The idea of investor protection, which formerly served as the
justification for introducing traditional values of fiduciary law into
corporate governance discussions, now carries little weight as a policy imperative.
The economic critique also increased sensitivity to the costs of
enforcing fiduciary duties. The direct costs of litigation constitute
only a part of this problem. Questions also arise about the institutional competence of courts. Although courts apply the business
judgment rule to limit inquiry into investment and management
decisionmaking, 97 conflicts of interest for the most part have been
held to lie outside of the forbidden territory. Lately, however, academics have come to view conflict-of-interest problems as economic
puzzles for technical solution. 98 The litigation process is an intrinsically suboptimal mode for working through to the solution of
problems thus characterized.
In sum, the prevailing disposition is to read the inherited body of
corporate fiduciary law narrowly and to presume that any expansion
of its reach is prohibitively costly absent a clear contrary showing. 99
self-dealing is an unsystematic risk, it can be diversified out. See EASTERBROOK & FisCHEL, supra note 66, at 122-124.
97. See Proposed Final Draft, supra note 1, § 4.01; id. § 4.01(c) cmt., at 227-44; id
reporter's note 2, at 245.
98. See, e.g., Johnston, supra note 94, at 312 (outlining possible "game" stages).
99. For notably narrow recent readings, see, for example, EASTERBROOK & FiSCHEL,
supra note 66, at 90-108, and Johnston, supra note 94, at 310-11 (describing the likelihood that expansive courts might reward baseless claims). Corporate governance commentators have given up on the prospect of effective market controls of management to
grapple anew with the old problem of management accountability. Ten or fifteen years
ago, commentaries dealing with accountability problems often recommended revised
fiduciary rules as a solution. See, e.g., Victor Brudney & Marvin A. Chirelstein, FairShares
in CorporateMergers and Takeovers, 88 HARV. L. REV. 297, 313-25 (arguing that gains from
parent subsidiary mergers should be divided equally as a percentage of premerger values); Brudney & Clark, supra note 56, at 1022-42 (recommending categorical prohibition of full-time executives

of public corporations

from taking other business

opportunities). Today, the governance debate focuses on self-help by institutional investors rather than direct legal control under the fiduciary rubric. See, e.g., Bernard S.
Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MIcH. L. REV. 520 (1990) (setting forth eco-

nomic analysis showing that institutional-investor involvement is cost effective); John C.
Coffee, Jr., Liquidity Versus Control. The InstitutionalInvestor as CorporateMonitor, 91 COLUM.
L. REV. 1277, 1355-57 (1991) (arguing for legal reforms designed to encourage institutional-investor participation in corporate governance); RonaldJ. Gilson & Reiner Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside Director: An Agenda for InstitutionalInvestors, 43 STAN. L. REV.
863, 905 (1991) (urging voluntary monitoring organization). It should be noted that
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B.

TheoreticalImplications of the Principles' Fiduciary Code
1.

The Avoidance of Political and Economic Theory

The Principles are not offered as a "restatement" of corporate law.
Indeed, corporate law's inherited structure causes many of the governance problems to which they are addressed. They accordingly
recommend changes in the legal model of governance structure.
These changes center on a monitoring model of board responsibility and a practice of nominating a majority of outside directors. 10 0
The drafters hope that these devices will cure the governance problem cooperatively, without full-scale government intervention. In
the drafters' projection, outside directors will monitor actively and
thereby prevent the worst excesses of management empowerment.
The realization of their reform aspirations depends on this projection's accuracy.' 0 1
The effectiveness of the Principles' fiduciary code also depends on
this projection's accuracy. The monitoring model's reliance on the
outside director parallels the fiduciary code's empowerment of the
disinterested director. This is the primary conceptual link between
the Principles' structural and fiduciary parts.
If we put this link to one side and consider the fiduciary code in
isolation, it quickly takes on many of the properties of a restatement.
It mostly ratifies the results of the decided cases and purveys fiduciary law as a closed legal system. It is composed of "principles," but
not principles rationally derived from a stated body of policy assumptions, whether political or economic in character. Indeed, the
drafters avoid references to political and economic paradigms of
corporate production. 10 2 Their commentaries instead stay very
much in a t,-aditional mold and refer randomly to the cumulation of
present legislation, to past judicial precedent, and to corporate
practice.
This positivist methodology works well for a project that purports
only to restate the law, but it goes against the grain of prevailing
academic standards respecting the articulation of legal "principles."
Most observers today assume that a body of legal principles cannot
be understood or justified adequately as a closed system that makes
reference only to its own stated premises. 0 3 The habit is to support
practical reasons support this; rules against self-dealing do not tend to address directly
the problem of ineffective management.
A contrary position in favor of fiduciary litigation as a governance tool is in the early
stages of articulation. See William W. Bratton, The Economic Structure of the Post-Contractual
Corporation, 87 Nw. U. L. REv. 180, 205-08 (1992); Charles M. Yablon, Overcompensating:
The Corporate Lawyer and Executive Pay, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 1867, 1867-70 (1992) (reviewing GRAEF CRYSTAL, IN SEARCH OF ExCESS (1991)) (arguing that corporate law should
play a larger role in curtailing outrageous executive compensation arrangements).
100. See, e.g., Proposed Final Draft, supra note 1, §§ 3.02, 3A.01.
101. See supra notes 14-26 and accompanying text.
102. See supra text accompanying note 73.
103. Cf Richard A. Posner, The Present Situation in Legal Scholarship, 90 YALE LJ. 1113
(1981) (dividing legal scholarship into three categories-doctrinal analysis, social science analysis, and normative analysis-and warning that doctrinal analysis is currently
endangered in the law schools). Today, academic treatments of corporate law tend to
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legal structures by reaching to outside economic, political, and social imperatives. That habit by now is so deeply ingrained that the
Principles become noteworthy for their limited frame of reference.
Further explanation and justification are appropriate.
Some reasons for the limitation suggest themselves. First, the
Principles, as an ALI project, are directed primarily to legal decision
makers.1 0 4 They import action in the world of practice rather than
explanation at the level of theory. In our polity, ideological trappings make a plan of action less plausible. The drafters' methodological restraint thus follows from the seriousness with which they
take their self-declared role.
Second, reference to outside political and economic frameworks
would be an awkward exercise for the drafters of this particular
code. Their product offers little to satisfy theorists of the corporation, whether proponents of the microeconomic corporation or
antimanagerialists.
Consider first economic theories of the firm. They influence the
code here and there. The drafters limit remedies carefully to discourage speculative litigation; 0 5 the policy of protecting the market
for corporate control shows its hand. 106 But the code on the whole
proceeds without regard to the economic theory of the firm. It unquestioningly accepts an undefined fairness principle as a limit on
contractual innovation in corporate governance. And it reaches out
to chill entrepreneurship with its strict constraints on insider trading, corporate opportunities, and the privileges of controlling
shareholders.
Now consider the antimanagerialist frame of reference. The Principles, by recommending alterations in the legal model of corporate
structure, implicitly share the antimanagerialists' concern about corporate accountability. But antimanagerialists will question the lawmaking role that the fiduciary code accords to the disinterested
director. It is one thing to suggest structural modifications of governance processes in the hope that outside directors will prove to be
effective. It is another thing to recommend present changes in the
system of substantive controls provided by fiduciary law based on
the same hope. The drafters identify no concrete basis to support
the conclusion that board level, conflict-resolution processes adequately protect investor interests. The antimanagerialist thus
evaluate law as a means to the end of wealth maximization and look beyond legal
sources to economic analysis for guidance on particular maximization strategies.
104. Segments of the code carry a recommendation respecting implementation by
judges or legislatures. See, e.g., Proposed Final Draft, supra note 1, § 4.01 cmt. b, at 184;
id. § 5.02 cmt. b, at 281.
105. See supra notes 26 and 35.
106. See supra text accompanying notes 65-67.
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should conclude that the disinterested-director barrier to fairness
review serves to complete a century-long process of eviscerating the
corporate duty of loyalty. 10 7
2.

The Implicit Description

The drafters solve no problems by choosing a traditional mode of
explanation and avoiding mention of current theories of the firm.
Hard descriptive and normative choices inherent in discussions of
fiduciary law do not disappear conveniently with the choice of a doctrinal framework of inquiry. The drafters of this code make some of
these choices and defer others. In both cases they refrain from discussing their choices explicitly.
Let us review their descriptive choices and fill in some of this discussion. They begin the code by announcing a contractual description: The duty at issue is one of "fair dealing," not "loyalty." 1 0 8
This at first looks like a foundational decision to emphasize the contractual aspects of corporate relationships. But it turns out to lack
powerful descriptive implications because the code does not reconstruct situations of power and dependence as situations of arm'slength bargaining.
Thus, despite the new title, the drafters' corporation is not contractual in an economic or doctrinal sense. What then is the operative description of the firm? The code's uneasy combination of
mandate and accommodation presupposes a description of corporate relationships that includes both legitimate pursuit of self-interest and necessary pursuit of the welfare of others. In this view,
corporations straddle the black-letter line that separates the traditional doctrinal descriptions of fiduciary and contract relationships.
The choice, as it were, is to be open-ended about descriptive
choices. No reductive vision of the corporation blocks consideration of all the particulars of a matter under the code.
It should be noted that the code follows the lead of the
microeconomic description of the corporation in disregarding corporate doctrine's categorical descriptions. But the resemblance is
incidental. The code's drafters have not interposed a rational-expectations description of the corporation. Instead they implicitly assume that a complex set of values figures into corporate behavior
and that tensions will arise between self-interest and self-abnegation. They leave these tensions for situational resolution based on
more particular descriptions. To facilitate these decisions, they install channels of communication between legal decisionmakers and
regulated actors. 0 9 The code's underlying description thus does
not imply deregulation. Indeed, in at least one instance, it could
open a path to increased scrutiny. As we have seen, the code collapses the shareholder-level fiduciary duty into the directors' and
107. See Marsh, supra note 82 (detailing the history of the duty of loyalty in the last
century).
108. See supra text accompanying note 11.
109. See infra text accompanying notes 119-20.
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officers' duty, and thereby negates a long-standing doctrinal distinc-

tion that discouraged judicial intervention. 1 0
This invitation to stepped-up scrutiny, however, stands alone in
the code. In the main, the drafters avoid asserting facts or shaping
rules that point the law in the direction of significantly intensified

fiduciary norms. The complex set of values in their description discourages the isolation of categories of self-interested conduct for

per se prescription." ' The description thus distances the code from
12
the antimanagerialist approach to fiduciary duty."
3.

Implicit Norms

Although the code's drafters address and reject the
microeconomic norm of free contract, 1 13 they make no sustained attempt to address the antimanagerialist case against their self-regulatory model. We can, however, draw on the drafters' comments
about the purpose of their enterprise to construct such a rebuttal.
This exercise begins the task of explaining and justifying the code's
normative profile.
The drafters emphasize that fairness is not an absolute, unchanging concept, but an evolving one.' 1 4 A particular determination of
"fairness" is a situational proposition; 1 5 internal corporate procedures are aspects of the situation thus reviewed. Furthermore, the
fairness norm does not evolve solely as a matter of the reaction of
legal decisionmakers to business events. Business practice bears
critically on the norm's articulation."I 6 In the end, "fairness" gains
substance as the result of a collaboration between legal decision
17
makers and business people."
110. The doctrine consigned shareholder-to-shareholder interrelations to a contractual world of self-interested pursuits. See infra notes 166-61 and accompanying text.
I 11. This description instead supports the across-the-board inclusion of corporate
decisionmaking into the legal process that we find in the code. See supra text accompanying note 17.
112. The implicit description, while neither microeconomic nor antimanagerialist,
does share significant assumptions with the relational model of contract law. The reference here is to the model of Macneil, see MACNEIL, supra note 80, rather than to the
microeconomic version set out by Williamson and others. See, e.g., OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INsTrruTIONS OF CAPITALISM:

TRACTING (1985).
fiduciary law.

FIRMS, MARKETS, RELATIONAL CON-

Part III of this Article applies the relational model to corporate

113. They do this in connection with their discussion of opting out. See supra text
accompanying note 68.
114. See Proposed Final Draft, supra note 1, Part V introductory note a, at 263-64.
115. Cf id. § 5.01 cmt. c, at 271-72 (stating that the "full meaning" of fair dealing is
context-dependent).

116. Cf id. § 5.02(a)(2)(B) cmt., at 292-300 (referring to business practice as ajustification for subjecting self-dealing transactions approved by disinterested directors to any
scrutiny at all).

117. Thus the drafters defend their fairness standard by reference to a practice document-the CorporateDirector'sGuidebook, Subcommittee on Functions and Responsibilities
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The code's provision for relaxed judicial scrutiny upon disinterested board-level approval facilitates this process. 118 The provision
induces corporations to take the law's fiduciary norms into account
in the conduct of their business. It keeps business practice attuned
to the norms of fiduciary law by vesting the directors with legal responsibility. At the same time, by providing for directorial input at
the threshold level, it keeps fiduciary law attuned to the values of its
constituents.
The code, then, avoids imposing a behavioral blueprint on corporate actors, and instead offers them a process designed to elicit behavioral norms that take their values into account. Its drafters thus
make a normative choice to privilege mediation over prohibition by
rule. The implicit assumption is that corporate law's normative
agenda should be carefully delimited; it should attempt to determine neither the course of production nor the shape of production
relationships.
It bears noting that this endorsement, rationalization, and expansion of the law's existing self-regulatory model of corporate conflictof-interest resolution is not a deregulatory program. The code induces corporate actors to participate in a lawmaking system with
carrots and sticks. If they do not participate, then the system subjects their behavior to traditional constraints. If they do participate,
then they must follow certain procedures if their internal decisions
respecting conflicts of interest are to attain the force of law. Furthermore, even where correct procedural forms are followed, the
code leaves a substantive limit in the background, a limit rooted in
the inherited body of law and built around the notion of the best
interests of the entity. The code thereby declines to open a door to
complete substantive self-determination by those in control of corporations. Its mandatory, albeit diluted, fairness standard leaves
open the constant possibility that the final decision will not be left
with corporate managers.' 19 This possibility assures that input from
legal professionals, and through them, society as a whole, will continue to influence the development of fiduciary law.
of Directors, ABA, Corporate Director's Guidebook, 32 Bus. LAw. 5 (1976). Id § 5.01 reporter's note 2, at 273-74; see also id. § 5.02(a)(2)(B) cmt., at 292-300 (referring to NEw
YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC., NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL

(1990) and corporate codes of conduct).
118. Under the code's standard of review, literally applied, judicial lawmaking in this
area operates on a factual and normative base supplied by the business people being
regulated. The reviewing court must find the transaction to be "clearly outside the
range of reasonableness." Id. § 5.02(a)(2)(B) cmt., at 292-300. This gives the approving directors initial input on the boundaries of the "range of reasonableness." To the
extent that the transaction must be "clearly" outside of that range in order to be held
violative of the duty, the approving directors also are accorded a degree of discretion in
fixing those boundaries. Finally, the determination of fair and unfair transactions within
the range is entirely left up to the directors.
119. The code is a regime of "reflexive" law in that it "requires the legal system to
view itself as a system-in-an-environment ... and to take account of the limits of its own
capacity as it attempts to regulate the functions and performances of other social subsystems." Gunther Teubner, Substantive and ReFeive Elements in Modern Law, 17 LAw &
Soc'y REv. 239, 255 (1983). But it is reflexive only to an extent; the final decision is not
always the province of the regulated entity.
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The code thus uses the mandate of fairness to force corporate
managers to mediate with other actors interested in the corporation
and in society in respect of self-dealing transactions.' 20 It succeeds
no better than prior law in purveying the fairness mandate in an
objective, self-executing form. But it does ameliorate the problem
of vagueness by providing a framework for the mandate's future application in which input from business people matters.
The code, by encouraging mediation between the self-interest of
the actors controlling the corporation and the interests of other corporate actors, necessarily also mediates at a theoretical level. Its implicit political theory of the firm is open-ended. Under the code, the
state and its decision makers retain final power to determine the
law's terms. But this confirmation of the sovereign's primacy in corporate lawmaking does not imply that the corporation is a state instrument that exercises delegated state authority. 12 1 The code
leaves too large a place for private participation for the image of the
state instrumentality to make sense. At the same time, the code
avoids treating the corporation as another species of private contract. Its corporation is a private contract with public implications,
suited to continued application of an inherited body of controls derived through the legal system.
C. Summary
The Principles' code, with the corporate law it restates, takes the
political middle ground. It avoids references to prevailing theories
of corporate law that tend to privilege one aspect of the corporation's broader politics and economics at another's expense. And
where it reshapes-as opposed to restates-the law, the code focuses on process over mandatory substance, whether regulatory or
deregulatory. It offers a system designed for the resolution of the
future's difficult questions rather than a set of directions that resolve
those difficult questions for us.

120. The best substantiation of the Principles' mediative approach is their most politically sensitive discussion-that on the purpose of the corporation. See Proposed Final
Draft, supra note 1, § 2.01 (stating that the corporation's purpose may focus on ethical
and philanthropic considerations); id. § 2.01 cmt. h, at 80-82; id. § 2.01 cmt. i, at 82-89
(setting forth ethical considerations and philanthropic purposes).
121. On this concession theory, compare Robert Hessen, A New Concept of Corporations:
A Contractualand Private Property Mode 30 HASTINGS L.J. 1327, 1327-28 (1979) (stating
that the "importance of the corporate concession theory can hardly be overstated"),
with William W. Bratton, Jr., The "Nexus of Contracts" Corporation: A CriticalAppraisal, 74
CORNELL L. REV. 407, 433-36 (1989) (arguing that the concession theory has lost its
vitality).
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I.

Restoring Confidence in CorporateFiduciary Law-A
Relational Perspective

The foregoing discussion puts a positive gloss on the Principles'
fiduciary code. It explains the drafters' choices in terms of a cooperative vision of corporate regulation. But it does not foreclose the
possibility of explaining some of these choices in other, less positive
terms. The code's descriptive and normative flexibility still plausibly can be read from a negative, antimanagerialist perspective.
Under this reading, the code creates opportunities to dilute fiduciary constraints and thus manifests the wider decline of confidence in
fiduciary regulation. Its empowerment of the disinterested director
is nonproblematic only presupposing a judgment that unmitigated
application of traditional doctrine leads to wrong answers and unjustified costs. With that judgment comes the hope that business
people, once invested with responsibility, will rise to the occasion
and prove capable of statesmanship. Attractive though this aspiration may be, it seems safe to predict that many business people will
fail to live up to it.
Indeed, weaknesses in the case for expanded self-regulation of
conflict of interest transactions are apparent even without resort to
an antimanagerialist point of view. Self-regulation tends to work
well in institutional contexts where different actors with diverging
interests play on a common regulated field in a situation of interdependence and balanced power. Differing interests, when coupled
with interdependence, give the actors incentives to monitor one another and enforce legal norms. 122 Successful self-regulation also
tends to require that independent, professionally motivated actors
from inside the industry be designated to perform technical regula1 23
tory functions.
Corporate boardrooms populated with outside directors appear
at first glance to have these characteristics. Because the outside directors' immediate financial interests lie with other firms, their personal reputational interests supposedly assure that the managers'
self-interested proposals receive a skeptical and scrupulous reception; technical problems concerning value are referred to outside,
supposedly neutral experts from the investment banking community. The premise that a principle affiliation to a different firm assures a director's independence is weak. As often has been noted,
the high ranking executives of other firms who tend to be appointed
as outside directors display a pattern of community of interest with
122. See David P. McCaffrey & Sue R. Faerman, Shared Regulation in the United
States Securities Industry 21-23 (Feb. 1993) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author); cf Ian Ayres &John Braithwaite, Tripartism: Regulatory Captureand Empowerment, 16
LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 435, 436-445 (1991) (suggesting that the problem of capture of
regulatory agencies by regulated actors can be ameliorated by the empowerment of
nongovernment organizations interested in effective regulation).
123. McCaffrey & Faerman, supra note 122, at 23-25 (noting strong ties between securities industry compliance officers and the SEC).
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inside directors and officers. 124 They do not necessarily have interests sufficiently at variance with the mangers' interests to assure effective monitoring. Furthermore, the technicians drawn on in board
room conflict of interest situations-investment bankers who render
the valuation opinions on which boards base fairness determinations-compete with one another for the business of providing this
and other services. These actors have not been noted for their inde25
pendence ofjudgment.'
These doubts about the effectiveness of the code's self-regulatory
scheme support the charge that it restates fiduciary law only to turn
it over to corporate actors to be destroyed. 1 26 The code's drafters
make few efforts to anticipate or rebut the charge.' 2 7 Indeed, they
invite it. Consider their change of the duty's name to "fair dealing."
Despite their technical explanation,' 28 the new contractual name
rhetorically cuts the code off from its roots in traditional fiduciary
concepts. It suggests a tie to the "no confidence" view of fiduciary
regulation; both the lack of confidence and the idea that corporate
law should be articulated in a contractual framework follow from a
common set of assumptions. This contractual reference, taken together with the code's limit on review of disinterested-director decisions, suggests not self-regulation, but deregulation.
The last part of this Article seeks to make a case for a more positive reading of the code-a reading that stresses the "regulatory"
124. See Victor Brudney, The Independent Direction-Heavenly City or Potemkin Village, 95
HARV. L. REV. 597, 609-612 (1982) (describing the "institutionally generated disinclina-

tion to hold colleagues at arm's length);James D. Cox & Harry L. Munsinger, Bias in the
Boardroom: Psychological Foundations and Legal Implications of Corporate Cohesion, 48 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 83, 99-108 (1985) (reviewing interpersonal familiarity and boardroom
bias).
The Principles' definition of "significant relationship," which separates independent
from inside directors, see Proposed Final Draft, supra note 1, § 1.34, does not distinguish
directors who identify with management's point of view from those who identify with the
point of view of investors.
If the institutional investor activism of recent years, see infra notes 148-50 and accompanying text, becomes institutionalized, then the boardroom may become a more suitable venue for self-regulation. Board members who identify themselves with investors'
perspectives could prove to be vigorous monitors in conflict-of-interest situations.
125. See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Marcel Kahan, Fairness Opinions: How FairAre They and
What Can Be Done About It?, 1989 DUKE LJ. 27, 53 (stating that investment banks face

conflicts of interest that lead them to use their discretion to render fairness opinions in
management's favor); see also TedJ. Fiflis, Responsibility of Investment Bankers to Shareholders,
70 WASH. U. L.Q. 497 (1992) (recommending gatekeeper liability for negligent fairness

opinions).
126. This debate will have a familiar sound to veterans of corporate governance discussions. The antimanagerialist realist emphasizes managerial cupidity and power pursuit. The opposite side responds with an aspirational notion of managers as statesmen.
See Gerald E. Frug, The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Law, 97 HARV. L. REv. 1276,
1297-98 (1984) (critiquing both models of corporate analysis).

127. One can do little more than point to instances where the code intensifies the
present or potential strength of the traditional fairness standard. See supra Part I.B.2.

128. See supra text accompanying note 12.
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aspect of "self-regulation." It makes two points toward this end.
First, the substantive law that the code restates already possesses the
responsiveness to the values of business actors that the code seeks
to institutionalize through self-regulation. Mediation long has been
intrinsic to the structure of corporate law. Second, the law's responsiveness, once highlighted, bolsters confidence in its normative mission. Traditional fiduciary concepts, properly understood, do not
lead to wrong answers in contemporary corporate situations. We
can address all the policy concerns that have prompted the recent
academic movement away from fiduciary solutions and at the same
time continue to make reference to traditional doctrinal notions.
Corporate law can respond to economic imperatives even as it incorporates conventional notions of relational power and dependence and aspirations of good will and self-sacrifice among
fiduciaries.
These points come forward when corporate law's recent evolution
is viewed from a relational perspective. The relational model assumes that actors make self-interested choices based on personal
preferences and at the same time subscribe to norms that take some
alternatives outside of the realm of free choice. Corporate law
makes the same assumptions: its fairness mandate presupposes that
self-serving corporate actors also subscribe to a norm of self-sacrifice. The norm's presence in the law implies an assertion that corporate actors continue to subscribe to the norm. The assertion does
not exclude the possibility that actors could abandon the norm in
the future and move the bulk of conflict of interest determinations
to the realm of preferential choice; but the burden lies on the party
claiming that abandonment has occurred.
The discussion that follows repeats the assertion that the norm
operates, but with a caveat. In recent years, corporate institutions
have evolved so as to expand the zone of preferential choice. A
combination of factors-increased security holding through intermediaries, open trade in corporate control, and expanded opportunities for exit through securitization-significantly increases
opportunities for treating corporate relationships as arm's-length
exchanges. Because actors who turn to arm's-length bargaining
tend to cease to rely on norms of self-sacrifice, the application of
fiduciary norms must be adjusted. But, because none of these developments completely expunges norms of self-sacrifice from the
corporate scene, they do not imply the elimination of fiduciary
norms. Corporate production continues to require too much longterm interdependence among the actors involved to be amenable to
organizational structures that dispense with cooperative norms. Investors still put themselves into a situation of dependence when
they transfer capital to legal entities under the control of parties
with different interests. Thus, aspirational standards of good will
and self-sacrifice continue to influence the legal model of corporate
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129
relationships, despite changing business practices.
It follows that modifications of the traditional doctrinal fiduciary
construct-such as those set out in the Principles' fiduciary codeneither follow from nor support the proposition that corporate fiduciary law should be reconceived as an arm of contract law that backstops the arm's-length exchanges of corporate actors. The rigid
doctrinal concepts of earlier eras have disappeared from the law because of developments in the ordinary course of business practice,
not because of some growing realization that a single contractual
essential lies at the core of corporate production. As this Part's discussion will show, contract law principles do bear a family resemblance to those applied in corporate contexts. Their meaning,
however, is contextually bounded by contract law's relational framework. Translated to corporate contexts, they have limited heuristic
power.
The Principles' fiduciary code thus legitimately draws on the same
aspirations that inform antecedent fiduciary law. The fiduciary concepts it restates are a necessary and vital part of the legal model of
corporate governance. Its self-regulatory structure should open
channels of communication respecting the meaning of these principles, but need not and should not enervate them. Under this view,
the contractual tide chosen by the drafters carries no interpretive
weight. Furthermore, disinterested-director participation should be
treated as lawmaking rather than as contracting. The code, as it
were, invites the board to apply the law rather than to avoid it.

A.

The Relational Propertiesof Corporate FiduciaryLaw

Traditional doctrine holds that fiduciary duties differ in kind from
contractual duties.13 0 This proposition is responsible for a great
deal of misunderstanding. Under the "no confidence" view, it is
thought to import a corporate fiduciary system that imposes trust
concepts on agency situations with wealth-depressive results. But
this much-discussed threat of inappropriate application of fiduciary
principles is more apparent than real. We can dispel it by drawing
on a relational theory of private law to modify the distinction between fiduciary and contract.

129. Cf Bernard S. Black, Is CorporateLaw Trivial?: A Politicaland EconomicAnalysis, 84
Nw. U. L. REv. 542, 573-74 (1990) (arguing that culture and extralegal norms of proper
behavior play an important part in managerial self restraint).
130. See supra text accompanying notes 78-81.
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1. Corporate Doctrine Without an EssentialFiduciary Duty
Under relationalism, all private interactions fall into the same capacious legal category. 3 1 Legal duties follow from the context and
incidents of the particular relationship. A notion of the "fiduciary"
survives as a characterization applicable in certain intertwined situations in the wider world of voluntary relationships. A contrasting
notion of "discrete contract" also survives. The discrete contract
lies at one end of the relational continuum; intertwined, enduring
relationships, including many trust relationships, lie at the other.
Different relationships can be identified as having different "discrete" or "relational" elements and different "contractual" or "fiduciary" elements; many relationships combine both elements of both
pairs.
Relational inspection thus breaks the doctrinal categories. But it
does not thereby undercut legal fiduciary duties. Mandatory imposition easily can be reconfirmed from a relational perspective. The
sovereign plays a role in every relationship. It enforces the discrete
contract, but otherwise is little involved with it. With relationships
of empowerment and dependence, government intervention is more
likely to become a part of the relationship's fabric. At some point,
sufficient responsibility is reposed in one party to prompt not only
legal duty, but nonwaivability of that duty.' 3 2 At the same time,
some situations deemed "essentially" fiduciary under the doctrine
come up for relational scrutiny because of their contractual aspects.
Questions are particularly pertinent in respect to relationships, such
as corporate relationships, midway along the continuum. The removal of the differentiating essence makes the actors and their practices more prominent as normative determinants of legal duties. In
the relational picture, the duties follow from the parties' values
rather than from the sovereign. In this framework of relational contingency, corporate fiduciary law becomes more cognizant of corporate practice and the values of corporate actors. Changes in the
practice thus should affect the law. For example, if shareholder expectations change from long-term to short-term, and from reliant to
self-protective, then the intensity of the fiduciary duties that protect
13 3
them should change correspondingly.
Even absent changes in practice, the relational perspective raises
questions about the status of legal duties once universally assumed
to be mandatory. If the "essential" fiduciary element is removed, it
131. There are two variants of relational contract theory, open and closed. The open
variant admits social and political values in addition to economic values. The closed
variant is limited by the frameworks of microeconomics. Macneil is the primary "open"
writer. See, e.g., MACNEIL, supra note 80, at 78-84. On corporate topics, see also Alison
G. Anderson, Conflicts of Interest: Efficiency, Fairness and Corporate Structure, 25 UCLA L.
REV. 738, 776-78 (1978). Williamson is the primary closed writer. See WILLIAMSON,
supra note 112, at 298-302; see also Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 VA. L. REV. 1089, 1095-1111 (1981). The "relationalism" referred to
in the text of this Article is the open variant.
132. See Anderson, supra note 131, at 759-61.
133. See infra notes 138-50 and accompanying text for a description of recent
changes.
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becomes plausible to recharacterize corporate relationships in contractual terms. Moreover, if the relational description includes an
effective waiver of legal protection by the beneficiary, the transformation to contract status becomes complete. A knowing waiver revokes the trust on which the fiduciary characterization rests. The
waiver shows that the parties themselves treat the relationship contractually. Arguably, respect for the parties' choice counsels that
the legal characterization follow suit. Under this analysis, nothing in
corporate relationships can be "essentially" fiduciary as long as
practical possibilities for waiver present themselves. It stands to
reason that the recent debate over the mandatory aspect of corporate fiduciary law devolved on all sides to a technical discussion
13 4
about standards for effective consent.
But making the fiduciary aspect of corporate law contingent
rather than essential does not imply that a foundational "corporate
contract" lies beneath the surface ready to substitute for the old fiduciary model of the corporation. The fact that, analytically, the fiduciary can yield to contrary agreement does not prove that
contrary agreements have been or could be entered into. In public
corporations, for example, no one seems to "know" as an empirical
proposition what degree of legal protection the parties really "prefer." The parties might not even know themselves-thus leaving
their ultimate preferences open to suggestion. It follows that questions about the effectiveness of consent to alternative contractual
arrangements need to be asked on an ongoing basis. Answers will
tend to depend on the model of consenting actor applied by the
commentator. The more disabled the actor becomes at self-protection, whether because of cognitive failings or erratic behavior patterns, the more appropriate mandatory fiduciary duties will prove to
be.
2. Business Practice and Corporate Fiduciary Law Under a Relational
Approach
Signals from actors in practice bear critically on the law's normative substance under a relational approach, just as they do under a
microeconomic model of the corporation. But the two approaches
construct the corporate actor differently and thus hypothesize different sets of signals. The microeconomic model assumes complete
self-interest while the relational model does not. The two models
therefore must treat the corporation differently to the extent that, in
practice, actors in corporate relationships treat one another with
good will and practice the self-abnegation described in the doctrinal
134. See, e.g.,
at 1575-77.
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picture of the fiduciary relationship. Under a relational view, if
good will underlies the relationship, then a legal regime built on the
self-interest model improperly disregards constitutive values. Such
a constitutive business ethic, once imposed in law, is not imposed
solely as sovereign dictate. It is self-imposed, albeit indirectly, by
35
corporate actors.1
Under a relational approach, the traditional fiduciary ethic could
be eliminated from corporate law. But doing so would require an
empirical model of the corporation working along the lines described byJensen and Meckling in their famous article; 3 6 actors on
all sides would have to engage in relationships conceived and executed as discrete contracts. In such a corporation, fiduciary duties
could not be imposed under either a relational or microeconomic
perspective. With arm's-length relationships and no external injuries, the state that mandated fiduciary norms would fail to respect
the actors' autonomy and values in favor of recognizing values from
some other source. Moreover, because the price terms of these discrete contracts would allocate the risk of opportunism, ex post judicial intervention might precipitate an uncompensated wealth
transfer to an opportunistic claimant. In contrast, where good will
suffuses the relationship, intervention to constrain opportunism recognizes the relational roles of the actors. As with any legitimate
contract enforcement, the ex post constraint on the actors' freedom
has a legitimating antecedent in their own conduct.
The Jensen and Meckling model does not describe fairly today's
public corporation. Even so, some corporate relationships, particularly those between investors and management, have taken on a
more discrete aspect in recent history. These changes in business
practice help explain the success of the rational-expectations approach in academic writing.' 3 7 They also help explain the emergence of the disinterested director in a mediating role in the
Principles.
During the postwar period, investors have become better able to
protect themselves. Today, they tend to hold diversified portfolios
of liquid securities traded through professional intermediaries.
During the first part of this century, when commentators first focused on the unprotected small investor, they did not. At that time,
a handful of investment bankers dominated the capital markets.
135. For an example ofjudicial responsiveness to the values of business actors, compare the opinions of Judges Clark and Friendly in Essex Universal Corp. v. Yates, 305
F.2d 572 (2d Cir. 1962). The question was whether the sale of a 28.3% block of stock
might amount to a breach of fiduciary duty under the sale of control doctrine. Id. at 573;
see supra note 60. Friendly, worried about the fiduciary problems of the sale but lacking
support in state law, advocated that the federal court say nothing at all. Id. at 581-82.
Clark would have remanded for development of a record: "[Plarticularly in view of our
lack of knowledge of corporate realities and the current standards of business morality, I
should prefer to avoid too precise instructions to the district court ... ." Id at 579.
136. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 87, at 343-57.
137. For a fuller exposition of this point, see William W. Bratton, Jr., The New Economic Theory of the Firm: Critical Perspectivesfrom History, 41 STAN. L. REv. 1471, 1517-26
(1989).
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Moreover, few individuals invested through intermediaries. 13 8 By
the time the contractual conception of the firm appeared in economics in the 1970s, the capital markets, supported by Depression-era
legal reforms, had been transformed. They offered a more reliable
place for trading. This change has encouraged the technical process
of "securitization," through which additional classes of investments
have become exchangeable and liquid.' 3 9 Competitive financial intermediaries holding well-diversified portfolios also have appeared.140 These institutions practice the economists' selfprotective theories and make this practice available to small investors. They have begun to replace unprotected small individuals as
the conventional "investor."' 14 ' As a result, the old policies of investor protection have lost much of their hold on legal discourse.
These changes have made the discrete contract an appropriate basis for understanding and evaluating corporate security holding relationships. In effect, the fiduciary principle suffered a loss of
support in business practice. Self-protective capacity, anonymity,
and speedy entrance and exit have made the traditional fiduciary indicia of power and dependence less apparent in the corporate atmosphere. The rational-expectations justification of fiduciary law
carries this practical adjustment to the level of theory.
But these changes do not by any means deliver us into the discrete world hypothesized byJensen and Meckling. The corporation
is too complex an institution. It requires a multi-sided description.' 4 2 At one level, sophisticated investors with diversified portfolios enter into discrete short-term participations. At the same time,
in any particular corporation, the shareholders as a whole make a
permanent capital investment. They lack the benefit of an institutional structure that puts them in a position of bargaining reciprocity and must rely on someone else to manage the capital. Even
assuming widespread institutional holding, cognizable shareholder
138. Richard Whitely, The Transformationof Business Financeinto FinancialEconomics: The
Roles of Academic Expansion and Changes in U.S. CapitalMarkets, 11 AccT. ORGANIZATIONS &
Soc'y 171, 181 (1986).
139. See generally JAMES C. VAN HORNE, FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT AND POLICY 527-29
(9th ed. 1992).
140. See Robert A. Taggart, Jr., The Growth of the 'Junk" Bond Market and Its Role in
Financing Takeovers, in MERGERS AND AcQUIsrrIoNs 5, 7 (AlanJ. Auerbach ed., 1988).
141. Contemporary scholarship focuses on ways to harness increasingly concentrated
institutional shareholdings to effect governance results. See, e.g., George W. Dent, Jr.,
Toward Unifying Ownershipand Control in the Public Corporation, 1989 Wis. L. REv. 881, 90715 (recommending proxy solicitation by 10 or 20 largest holders). Direct legal intervention to protect the unsophisticated, small shareholders does not figure into contemporary governance discussions as a policy imperative. Cf Gordon, supra note 88, at 1557
(arguing that no special protection of uninformed investors is necessary in connection
with charter terms of companies doing initial public offerings).
142. Traditional corporate doctrine does manage a multi-sided, if still imperfect, picture of the corporation. See supra text accompanying notes 78-83.
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dependence and management power remain. Moreover, the group
of shareholders can diversify risks of mismanagement only to an extent. Ultimately, investors stand on one side in our institutional
framework and managers on the other. One side still may injure the
other, despite diversification. In short, a basis remains to sustain
the old picture of separated ownership and control. 143 The ratification of the legitimacy of mandatory fiduciary duty by academic writers and the drafters of the Principles14 4 confirms this point.
The positive picture remains unsettled. Investors and managers
continue to make relational adjustments, as shown by some recent
developments in business practice. First, the momentum of corporate restructuring fell off drastically when credit tightened. 145 This
decline has disempowered market actors relative to managers and
caused discrete contracts between market actors to play a lesser role
in corporate power allocation.14 6 The microeconomic story of market constraints on management discretion has lost force
47
correspondingly. 1

Second, institutional investors, particularly public pension
funds, 148 have become assertive in corporate governance matters. 14 9
This development suggests that institutional holdings have become
143. See supra note 84. According to the latest economic studies, the capital asset
pricing model's explanatory capacity is smaller than formerly supposed. See Eugene F.
Fama & Kenneth R. French, The Cross-Section of Expected Stock Returns, 47J. FIN. 427, 42940 (1992). Possibilities for shareholder injury increase accordingly.
144. See supra text accompanying notes 5-10.
145. The number of LBO restructurings peaked at 125 in 1988; the dollar amount of
those restructurings peaked in the last quarter of 1988. The market collapsed in the
fourth quarter of 1989. In the first half of 1990, only 11 new LBOs were announced. See
Arthur Fleischer, Jr., Mergers andAcquisitions in the 1990's, in 2 22ND ANNUAL INsTrrUTE ON
SECURITEs REGULATION, at 131, 134 (PLI Corporate Practice Course Handbook Series
No. 713, 1990).
146. For a contradictory theory of the rise of the market for corporate control and the
empowerment of market actors, see Bratton, supra note 137, at 1517-26.
147. Even Easterbrook and Fischel, the principal proponents of the market-constraint
story of corporate governance, have reconsidered the scope of the operative market. See
EASTERBROOK & FiSCHEL, supra note 66, at 168-70, 218 (noting that the "proliferation of
state antitakeover statutes" calls into question whether state competition for corporate
charters is beneficial).
148. The California Public Employees Retirement System ("CalPERS") has been the
most active. See, e.g., Pension Fund Petition Could PromptBroad Changes in SEC's Proxy System,
5 Corp. Couns. Wkly. (BNA), No. 9, at 8, (Feb. 21, 1990) (reporting CalPERS' petition
for changes in the SEC proxy rules to facilitate communication and action among shareholders); Eric N. Berg, Sears Is Urged to Set Up Advisory Panel of Big Holders, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 4, 1990, at D3 (reporting CalPERS' proposal of a nine-member shareholder advisory committee to advise floundering managers). But private funds also have taken a
more aggressive posture. See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 99, at 867-68 n.12 (noting
that Fidelity Investments has removed investment limitations on its mutual funds to allow them to purchase more than 10% of a company's stock, join in a proxy fight, or seek
the sale of a company).
149. Their efforts have taken three directions. First, they have used their votes and
voices actively to discourage defenses against the operation of the market for corporate
control and to encourage more aggressive use of the shareholder franchise. Second,
and more important, they have publicly criticized certain managers and have urged the
creation of shareholder advisory committees. Finally, they occasionally have sought to
influence the selection of their portfolio companies' outside directors. Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 99, at 892-95. For a survey of recent activities, see John Pound, Beyond
Takeovers: Politics Comes to Corporate Control, 70 HARV. BUS. REV., Mar.-Apr. 1992, at 83.
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large enough to limit the force of the old "Wall Street Rule." Given
sufficiently large holdings, diversification and portfolio adjustment
may not be the final steps in the process of maximizing return on
investment. Expenditures of time and money in corporate governance processes may produce greater returns than selling and moving on to the securities of yet another suboptimally managed
firm.

15 0

Suppose that collective action by institutional holders becomes an
everyday part of corporate life. The power structures of public corporations would look somewhat different as a result. Under the still
meaningful separation of ownership and control, management
stands on one side of a power divide and market actors stand on the
other. They have little means of power allocation inter se other
than the drastic move of a hostile tender offer. Institutions in the
habit of talking to each other might end up forming coalitions and
go on to sustained interaction with management.1 5 1 Power would
flow to them as a result. Legal duties might change accordingly.
The legal picture of complete shareholder dependence becomes
less appropriate, the classic shareholder collective action problem
having been surmounted to some extent. Possibilities for opting
out would open up. 15 2 This would not necessarily cause the displacement of traditional fiduciary ideology from the law, however;
arm's-length "market" treatment of these relationships would not
be appropriate either. Indeed, given the continued existence of a
dependent subclass of shareholders, the fidelity of the newly empowered institutions becomes a legal concern. The projected picture less resembles the cold contracting world of the microeconomic
model than the colorful world of the close corporation. As with
close corporations, special balances of self-interest and responsibility would develop under the fiduciary rubric.
B.

RelationalFlexibility Without a ContractualEssence

The notion that traditional fiduciary concepts invite wrong answers to corporate questions implies a need to reconceive the doctrine's conceptual underpinnings. This search for additional
150. For a cost-benefit analysis, see Black, supra note 99, at 570-585; see also Special
Report, Economic Reasoning ChangingDirection of SEC Deliberations, Grundfest States, 22 Sec.
Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 206, 209 (Feb. 9, 1990).
151. For a discussion of the implications of coalition building in the context of corporate control transfers, see Coffee, supra note 46, at 1531-49.
152. On the other hand, it might take considerable structural positive-law reform to
bring this picture into reality. Professor Dent proposes a fundamental restructuring that
puts the proxy machinery in shareholder hands. He suggests that the law should give a
committee of the 10 or 20 largest shareholders exclusive access to the corporate treasury to pay for proxy solicitations. See George W. Dent, Jr., Toward Unifying Ownership and
Control in the Public Corporation, 1989 Wis. L. REV. 881, 907.
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normative flexibility leads to contract law's less intense fairness
norm. As with the title of the Principles' code, "loyalty" is replaced
with "fair dealing." But, going beyond the title, the change is made
thoroughgoing.
Unfortunately, this search for a right answer invites a different
sort of wrong answer. Responsiveness to business practice will not
find its way into the law's fabric if an essential corporate contract is
constructed to replace a discarded notion of essential fiduciary duty.
All the contractual theories of the corporation articulated in recent
years pose this problem.' 5 3 Furthermore, the problem of wrong answers has been overstated. It lies mostly in the law reviews themselves. Commentators tend to respond to one another at the same
time that they respond to the cases. As we have seen, traditional
fiduciary principles overlap in part with the assertions of antimanagerialist academics.15 4 But the two are distinct at bottom because fiduciary doctrine never follows from a single, well-defined
theory of corporate governance. Academic corporate-governance
discourse tends to lose sight of this point, mistakenly assuming that
antimanagerialist assertions and doctrinal fiduciary concepts follow
from a single point of view. The conflation, not the case law, creates
the threat of fiduciary overkill.
The solution to the problem is de novo examination of corporate
fiduciary doctrine without an antecedent paradigmatic program of
one or another sort. Like contract law, corporate fiduciary law turns
out to be sensitive to the facts of particular relationships. But, because the two bodies of law have evolved in the service of different
relationships, their structural frameworks are not interchangeable.
1. A Good-Faith Norm
Consider, as a means to the end of evaluating corporate doctrine's relational flexibility, Professor Coffee's suggestion that we
look to contract law's "good faith" norm in articulating the scope of
fiduciary duties. Coffee's treatment is the most relationally sensitive
of the recent discussions of corporate law's contractual aspects. He
avoids the constraints of microeconomic notions of contract and
looks both to actors in practice and to positive law for relational
substance. His approach even has a mediative aspect. He draws on
the open-ended "omitted term" concept of contract doctrine and
accords gap-filling judges the power to style themselves as police
against ex post opportunism. 5 5 But Coffee also proposes a normative essence: "good faith." He offers this as a minimum standard
153. See supra text accompanying notes 126-28.

154. Antimanagerialists can be as critical of fiduciary doctrine as can Chicago School

economists. For general criticism, see, for example, William L. Gary, Federalismand Corparate Law: Reflections on Delaware, 83 YALE LJ. 663, 673-74, 677-683 (1974) (criticizing
the Delaware courts' application of the duty of loyalty), and Chirelstein, supra note 85, at

205-07 (recommending abolition of common law fiduciary duty and fairness standards
respecting managers in favor of legislated rules or standards of a more specific
character).
155. Coffee, supra note 90, at 1623, 1653-64.
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56
for mandatory corporate law.'
Coffee's good faith norm is plausible. The "good faith" actor
avoids self-interested action that is unnecessary to the realization of
his or her own contract expectations and that impairs the expectations of the other party. 157 This good faith concept has a healthy
flexibility when inserted into corporate law. It avoids overplaying
norms of management selflessness. At the same time, it recognizes
the value and necessity of self-abnegation. To some extent, therefore, it respects the traditional dynamic of corporate fiduciary doctrine. Indeed, good faith often is the norm actually applied in many
corporate cases decided under the "fiduciary" appellation. 158
Unfortunately, the fit is still far from perfect. Contract law and
corporate law, viewed relationally, overlap at significant points without being coextensive. "Good faith," when applied to corporate
contexts, entails normative realignment. Values get lost in the
process.
Contract law responds to a range of situations, from the simple
sale of goods for money to long-term, open-ended situations of supply or co-ownership. Contract cases range between discrete and relational transactions, and between arm's-length and interdependent
postures on the actors' parts. The reactions of decision makers
dealing with relationships falling along these ranges tend to be
colored by their respective individualistic or altruistic dispositions.1 5 9 As a result, norms of selflessness have a volatile pattern of
application. In practice, the "good faith" mandate is not taken as a
directive to recognize limitations on self-interested value maximization. It merely invites consideration of the possibility. In many situations, the presumption remains against the party requesting that
self-interest be constrained, 60 even though the Restatement (Second)
of Contracts lays down good faith as an absolute value attaching to all

156. Id. at 1674 (combining good faith with the contract notion of unconscionability).
157. Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation, 1988
DUKE LJ. 879, 900.
158. See, e.g., Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 235 F.2d 369, 373 (3d Cir. 1956) (discussing a failure to disclose facts in connection with exercise of call right of convertible
security); Smith v. Atlantic Properties, Inc., 422 N.W.2d 798 (Mass. App. 198 1) (discussing the self-interested use of a close-corporation veto power).
Coffee notes, probably correctly, that rendering fiduciary duties in good faith terms
would cause little change in the terms of traditional self-dealing cases. Coffee, supra
note 90, at 1665.
159. See generally Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89
HAtv. L. REV. 1685, 1713, 1723-24 (1976) (arguing that legal doctrines fashioned by
legislators and judges are affected by altruism and individualism).
160. Cases dealing with corporate bond contracts make a good example. Bondholders who have lost value as the result of issuer opportunism repeatedly make "good
faith" claims, only to be told by the judge that theirs is an arm's-length contract that
permits self-interested value appropriation short of fraud. See, e.g., Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 1504, 1516-23 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
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contracts.161

Corporate law responds to a wider range on the relational continuum. Certain corporate situations track contract patterns very
closely. For example, with corporate shareholder-to-shareholder
duties, we find zones of self-interest and zones in which good faith
tempers self-interest. Like contract law, corporate law here mediates conflicts between the accompanying norms. 162 But other corporate situations do not follow contract patterns. These involve
heightened interdependence absent from the subject matter of basic
contract law. Here, in the zone of the duty of loyalty, corporate law
subordinates self-interest in a mode not replicated in contract law.
2. Comparing the Patterns
The corporate duty of loyalty imposes a burden of justification
respecting self-interested activities. As we have seen, the actors subject to the duty, by employing the appropriate procedures, can shift
the burden to the objecting shareholder. Under existing law, however, the shift in the burden does not preclude a shareholder showing of substantive unfairness.163 This fairness determination does,
of course, require mediation between self-interest and self-sacrifice.
Viewed in this way, the corporate duty looks like the contract goodfaith duty, which calls for the same mediation.
The similarities, however, are not thoroughgoing. The corporatelaw mediation proceeds on a mandatory foundation; the director or
officer cannot avoid the possibility of substantive scrutiny. The contract good-faith mediation proceeds in a different context. Contract
enforces transactions in the first instance on a formal showing of
consent and consideration. Self-interest is assumed and accepted
without scrutiny; the doctrine specifies that legal decision makers
should not inquire into the equivalency of the values exchanged.'6
Of course, this equivalency inquiry nevertheless can arise under
modifying doctrines such as good faith and unconscionability, but
only on a special showing that takes the case out of the normal regime of sanctioned self-interest. 6 5 Thus, contract law, and the core
of corporate fiduciary law, employ distinct presumptions respecting
the appropriateness of self-interested behavior. The good faith
norm, despite similar verbiage, is contextually bound. It asks materially less of corporate actors than does the fiduciary fairness norm.
Corporate shareholder-to-shareholder duties, in contrast, support
direct comparison with contract law. Corporate doctrine remits
shareholders to a contractual world. Absent fraud, it approves self161. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1979).162. See infra notes 166-75 and accompanying text.
163. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
164. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 79; id. § 79 cmt. c (1979). Viewed
from an economic perspective, this provision of contract doctrine has the same roots as
the contractarian challenge to judicial scrutiny of corporate transactions for fairness.
The assumption is that the parties are better equipped to determine price than the
judge. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 71 (2d ed. 1977).
165. See E. ALLEN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS §§ 4.1, 4.9 (2d ed. 1990).
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interest with respect to votes and sales of shares. 16 6 Here, traditionally, the law gave us the opposite of fiduciary overkill-the close corporation freezeout in which bad faith majority shareholders capture
the returns on minority shareholders' investments.1 6 7 Of course,
shareholder-to-shareholder law never quite replicated the traditional normative climate of sales of fungible goods; unlike widgets,
cooperation asserts itshareholder votes cannot be sold. Mandated
68
self to make vote selling a breach of duty.'
As we have seen, corporate law has developed doctrines that restrain self-interested conduct at the shareholder level.' 6 9 Twentieth-century contract law has developed the doctrines of good faith
and unconscionability to perform analogous tasks. Many parallels
can be drawn between the two restraining doctrines.
The corporate case law has a mediative aspect.170 The cases effect
situational accommodations of self-interest and cooperation. In so
166. HARRY G. HENN &JOHN R. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS 654-56, 723-24
(3d ed. 1983).
167. For a description of this phenomenon, see CLARK, supra note 82, §§ 12.1, 12.4.
For a recent summary of the evolution of legal norms respecting private ordering in
close corporation contexts, see Thompson, supra note 91, at 392-403.
168. See Chew v. Inverness Management Corp., 352 A.2d 426, 430 (Del. Ch. 1976);
Macht v. Merchants Mortgage & Credit Co., 194 A. 19, 22 (Del. Ch. 1937).
169. See supra text accompanying notes 44-46.
170. Both the case law and the mediative aspect have long historical roots. The leading late nineteenth-century case is Meeker v. Winthrop Iron Co., 17 F. 48 (1883).
There, a corporation that failed to secure a favorable mining lease purchased a majority
of the stock of the potential lessor, took control, and effected adoption of the previously
unsuccessful lease proposal. The minority stockholders brought a successful action.
The court took the majority control situation as an occasion for inquiring into the adequacy of the consideration on the lease. Id. at 49-51. Said the court:
The ownership of a majority of the capital stock of a corporation invests the

holders thereof with many valuable incidental rights.... But, in thus assuming control, they also take upon themselves the correlative duty of diligence
and good faith. They cannot lawfully manipulate the company's business in
their own interests to the injury of other corporators.
Id. at 50. Citing this case and a standard of "utmost good faith" based on majority control power, Victor Morawetz set out a majority-to-minority fairness duty in his 1886 treatise. See VICTOR MORAWETZ, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 477,
at 451-452 (Boston, Little, Brown, & Company, 2d ed. 1886). Significantly, Morawetz
and his contemporaries set out an additional contractual basis of responsibility. The
majority could not depart from the terms of the charter, see id., and had to maintain the
corporation's original objects of formation.
The majority-to-minority duty thus entered the doctrine in an awkward posture.
Stockholders did not owe fiduciary duties to each other, SEYMOUR D. THOMPSON, COM-

§ 8601, at 7207 (San Francisco, Bancroft-Whitney Company 1894), but majority stockholders could in some cases owe
duties that resembled fiduciary duties to minorities. Id. The phrase "quasi trust relation" appears. CHARLES F. BEACH, JR., COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 70, at 140-41 (Chicago, T.H. Flood & Co. 1891); see also WILLIAM W. CooK, A
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF STOCK AND STOCKHOLDERS § 662, at 697-698 (New York,
Baher, Voorhis & Co. 1887). For later restatements of the doctrine, see HARRY W. BALMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS

LANTINE, BALLANTINE ON CORPORATIONS §

LIAM L. MARSHALL,
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278 (rev. ed. 1946);

WILLIAM L. CLARK & WIL-

TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS

§§ 626-627, at
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doing they take on an experimental quality. Consider three leading
Massachusetts cases that constrain the classic freezeout under the
fiduciary rubric. 17 ' The first opinion lurches in the direction of a
strict rule of equality.' 7 2 The second pares back the rule to a standard balancing of equality and business purpose. 173 This purportedly "fiduciary" rule, applied to an intracorporate deadlock
situation in the third case, becomes a reasonableness review of
the tactical excesses of arm's-length players.' 7 4 At this point, the
court's analysis of fiduciary duty becomes indistinguishable from
"good faith" scrutiny of performance patterns under long-term
175
contracts.
The same tentativeness and adaptability appear in cases employing the majority-to-minority shareholders' duty to protect holders of
publicly traded securities. Courts have imposed strong fiduciary
bars, only to retrench in later cases involving exercises of call
rights, 17 6 sales of control blocks at premium prices, 177 and takeout
mergers. 178 In these cases, as in the Massachusetts close-corporation cases, the courts initially recognize that the free play of selfinterest under the traditional doctrine presents an ethical problem.
They respond with familiar fiduciary constraints.1 79 Over time, it
turns out that norms of welfare and reciprocity counsel a more
even-handed mediation. As the doctrine evolves, it approximates
the contractual good-faith restraint.' 8 0
1904-05 (1901); CHARLES B. ELLIOTr, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS §§ 432,433, 474 (Stewart Chaplin ed., 5th rev. ed. 1923);JOHN T. MULLiGAN, LAW
OF CORPORATIONS § 74, at 235-237 (1913).

Today, of course, we call the majority-to-minority duty "fiduciary." Even so, the
"quasi-fiduciary" appellation of a century ago would not be inappropriate.
171. In chronological order, these are Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d
505 (Mass. 1975), Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657 (Mass.
1977), and Smith v. Atlantic Properties, Inc., 422 N.E.2d 798 (Mass. App. Ct. 1981). For
a very different reading of these cases, see Mitchell, supra note 86, at 1699-1714 (criticizing the succession of progressive departure from the fiduciary principle).
172. Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 515-17.
173. Wilkes, 353 N.E.2d at 663.
174. Smith, 422 N.E.2d at 801-03.
175. See, e.g., Bloor v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 601 F.2d 609, 614 (2d Cir. 1979); Parev
Products Co. v. I. Rokeach & Sons, 124 F.2d 147, 149 (2d Cir. 1941).
176. Compare Zahn v. Transamerica Corp., 162 F.2d 36 (1947) with Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 235 F.2d 369 (3d Cir. 1956) (damages phase of same case).
177. Compare Perlman v. Feldman, 219 F.2d 173, 175-76 (2d Cir.) (holding a majority
stockholder to a standard of strict fiduciary duty during a controlling interest sale), cert.
denied, 349 U.S. 952 (1955) andJones v. H.F. Ahmanson & Co., 460 P.2d 464, 471 (Cal.
1969) (same) with Zetlin v. Hanson Holdings, Inc., 397 N.E.2d 387, 388 (N.Y. 1979)
(applying the less strict good faith fiduciary duty to a sale of stock by a majority
shareholder).
178. Compare Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977) (holding that majority shareholders owe the minority a fiduciary duty) with Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457
A.2d 701, 703 (Del. 1983) (holding that the minority shareholder must demonstrate
unfairness to win a suit challenging a cash-out merger).
179. See supra notes 171-75 and accompanying text.
180. Ironically, in the cases involving publicly traded securities, the modified fiduciary duty doctrine provided firm ground for the restructurings of the late 1980s. Decisionmakers in effect refrained from imposing cooperative norms so that a great
experiment in wealth maximization through arm's-length contract could go forward
without a significant burden of litigation from those injured in the process.
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The free play of self-interest at the shareholder level can be constrained by contract as well as by judicial decree. With mutual
promises regarding voting and management, close-corporation
shareholders contain the dangers of self-interested conduct by imposing rules of cooperation on themselves. Here the mediation of
self-interest and cooperation follows a crooked path to a stable balance. Shareholders "opt out" of the juridical corporate structure in
order to "opt in" to a self-imposed system of mutual responsibility.
Shareholders resort to contract to achieve mutual responsibility because they mistrust one another. Contractual devices are required
in the close-corporation context because the law, even with shareholder-level fiduciary protections well-established, offers insufficient
ex ante protection of the shareholders' trust. But, just as traditional
corporate shareholder-to-shareholder law had to be modified to allow for fiduciary protections, it also had to be modified to allow for
contract devices. Shareholders' agreements tend to traverse the
structural norm of management by the board of directors. This
norm, which pursues an ideal of group action and responsibility,
had to be modified so that the same goal could be achieved through
arm's-length negotiation. 8 1 But the conflict arose less between

"corporate" and "contractual" principles than between clumsy and
adroit integrations of self-interest and cooperation. Here, contract
succeeds better.
Reconsider Professor Coffee's good faith proposition in the light
of this survey. It assumes that corporate law should have a single
positive and normative center of gravity. This assumption is widely

shared. We can read the history of corporate legal theory during

the past decade or so as a tripartite struggle among backers of three
competing centers of gravity. Antimanagerialists advocated a strong
fiduciary norm, economic writers promoted self-interest, and institutional contractarians-such as Coffee-backed good faith.1

2

This

discourse meets a positive objection: relationships in and around a
single corporation do not have a single normative center of gravity;
they entail many norms. The actors mediate internally between
these norms, and the law serves as a backstop by providing additional mediation and a few mandates. The actors and lawmakers
both draw on good faith and traditional fiduciary standards of fairness, and at the same time sanction the self-interested infliction of

injury on others.
181. See Coffee, supra note 90, at 1642-45.
182. Most in the latter group treat good faith as a rational maximizing tool. See Bratton, supra note 77, at 70-71 (noting that scholarship critical of the neoclassical "nexus of
contracts" theory of the firm tends to proceed in a rational expectations framework and
conclude with a finding of contract failure). Coffee's discussion is notable for the influence of the conventional conception. Coffee, supra note 90.
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In particular situations, normative reasons may be suggested for
reshaping the law to allocate more weight to one or another of the
norms. But a global presumption in favor of one norm or another
seems unjustified. Here the inherited body of corporate legal doctrine shows greater refinement than contemporary corporate legal
theory. The doctrine holds to the fiduciary norm at the board level,
but not absolutely. At the shareholder level, it admits good faith
with much the same situational skepticism that we find in contract
doctrine. Self-interest, tempered by the insider trading rules,
3
prevails on the securities markets.18
Corporate law, then, applies the same values in corporate contexts that contract law applies in contract contexts. No basis results
for realignment of corporate doctrine to a template drawn from basic contract law, even under the values that inform contract law.
The two deal with different relationships.
C. Summary
This Part's relational defense of the inherited body of corporate
fiduciary law has significant points in common with the Principles'
code, at least as explicated in the previous Part's discussion of its
drafters' implicit choices. Both aspire to leave the law's foundations
open and admit the possibility that developments in business practice will change legal norms. Both also avoid the narrowing effects
of politically driven paradigms. Oddly, though, recognition of these
points of consonance between the two implies a point of dissonance.
If fiduciary law is as flexible and sensitive to the values of actors in
practice as this Part suggests, then it is not clear why the code
needed to take steps to strengthen its self-regulatory aspect. The
code's recognition of the judgments of disinterested directors does
add an explicit guaranty of a full hearing for corporate purposes and
business exigencies. But it does so at the cost of a risk of impairment of the integrity of vital norms. The cost-benefit determination
remains open.
Conclusion
It is difficult to fault the Principles for recognizing that a complex
set of values must be synchronized in the regulation of self-dealing
transactions and recommending that corporate fiduciary law should
privilege mediation over prohibition by rule. Nor can the code be
faulted for recognizing that business people have a role in the creation of fiduciary law and for encouraging their participation in the
lawmaking process. The problem arises when the code articulates
the business actors' participatory role. By conceding a measure of
adjudicatory authority to business people while holding out the possibility of later judicial reversal under an open standard, the code
183. Adjustments of norms in the doctrine have been accomplished with finesse. Effective legal mediation lies as much in the recognition and correction of a misstep as in
getting it absolutely right the first time.
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brings business actors into the lawmaking process but leaves the
precise definition of their role for later solution. That solution's
contours will depend on the relative credibility of board room determinations as adjudications and on the vitality of the code's limiting
fairness norm.
The time for according weight to the board room determination
has not arrived and could be long in coming. Despite the presence
of the Principles' independent directors, board room processes still
do not assure that fiduciary determinations will include adequate
consideration of the investor's point of view. This lack of process
integrity is material, because the fiduciary norm remains vital. It is
one thing to say that the norm's legitimate articulation requires the
input of business people. It is quite another to say that a board
called upon to approve a colleague's self-interested transaction
should be the primary source for such input. We can rely on other
channels. Fiduciary law stays sensitive to the values of business people as the structural proposition. Our corporate law system provides endless opportunities for management participation in policy
formulation. Given jurisdictional competition and the leadership
role of the management-responsive state of Delaware, business preferences are assured of serious consideration.
The Principles' provision for self-regulation of conflict of interest
transactions therefore should be seen as a structure for limited,
present implementation but possible future expansion. For now,
the business actors whom the code brings into the legal process
should be reviewed strictly. Their tasks are to develop a record of
fact and to apply law formulated elsewhere. Courts should not hesitate to overrule their normative judgments.
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